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Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: 
A Revised Analysis 
A. Benjamin Spencert 
Personal jurisdiction doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court is in disarray. As a consti­
tutional doctrine whose contours remain imprecise, the law of personal jurisdiction has generated 
confusion, unpredictability, and extensive satellite litigation over what should be an uncomplicated 
preliminary issue. Many commentators have long lamented these defects, making suggestions for 
how the doctrine could be improved. Although many of these proposals have had much to offer, 
they generally have failed to articulate (or adequately justify or explain) a simple and sound ap­
proach to jurisdiction that the Supreme Court can embrace. This Article revises the law of personal 
jurisdiction by reconceiving the proper role of due process within the doctrine-which is to ensure 
that defendants receive adequate notice of an action and are protected against arbitrary assertions 
of governmental power-and reasserting the role of state sovereignty and interstate federalism as 
concepts that permit jurisdiction over all disputes in which a state has a legitimate interest. The 
doctrines of venue and forum non conveniens are left to redress any meaningful burdens on de­
fendants arising out of having to litigate in inconvenient fora. The result is a coherent analysis that 
will provide litigants and courts clear guidance regarding the scope of a court's jurisdiction to 
adjudicate. 
New winds are blowing on old doctrines, the critical spirit 
infiltrates traditional formulas.' 
INTRODUCTION 
Adjudicatory jurisdiction, which refers to the power of a court to 
hear a case, is the central and most basic preliminary issue faced by 
courts in the United States.' A court (state or federal) may not enter a 
binding judgment in resolution of a matter unless it has jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the dispute. Adjudicatory jurisdiction is traditionally thought 
to have two dimensions: first, a subject matter component that identi­
fies the types of cases that a court may hear; and second, a personal 
component that refers to the ability of a court to bind a particular in-
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author would 
like to thank Carl Tobias, Corinna Lain, and Kurt Meyers for reviewing this Article and Laura 
Benavitch , Christy Garrett, and John Selbach for their helpful research assistance. 
1 Felix Frankfurter, The Early Writings of 0. W. Holmes,Jr.,44 Harv L Rev 717,717 (1931). 
2 The term "judicial jurisdiction" has also been used to embody the concept of adjudica­
tory jurisdiction. See, for example, Quill Corp v North Dakota, 504 US 298,307 (1992) (referring 
to International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310 (1945), as a case "in the area of judicial juris­
diction"). See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ch 3, Introductory Note (1971). 
Adjudicatory jurisdiction should be contrasted with legislative or regulatory jurisdiction, which 
refers to the authority of a state to apply its laws to certain conduct. 
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dividual or entity as a defendant to the judgment rendered.
3 
The quest 
to settle upon clear principles that govern the permissible reach of 
courts in this latter sense (personal jurisdiction) has occupied the Su­
preme Court ever since its seminal case of Pennoyer v Neff,4 if not be­
fore that time. 
Forty years ago, Professors Arthur von Mehren and Donald Traut­
man attempted to impose some coherence on the doctrine of adjudi­
catory jurisdiction as it had been reformulated in International Shoe 
Co v Washington' by identifying distinct general and specific jurisdic­
tional analyses and discarding the distinctions of in personam, in rem, 
and quasi in rem jurisdiction.
6 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's 
subsequent jurisprudence in this area did more to confuse and com­
plicate the doctrine than Professors von Mehren and Trautman had 
done to clarify it. With each decision, the Court has convulsed away 
from the simple notion in International Shoe that state sovereignty 
and due process permit jurisdiction over nonresidents who are mini­
mally connected with the forum,' to a confused defendant-centric doc­
trine obsessed with defendants' intentions, expectations, and experi­
ences of inconvenience. In so doing, the Court has created a doctrine 
quite removed from its theoretical foundations-for neither due proc­
ess nor state sovereignty harbor any concern for these issues that now 
take center stage within contemporary personal jurisdiction analysis. 
Such a disconnect might have been forgivable if the result were a clear 
doctrine that achieved predictable, practical, and just results-but such 
is not the case. To the contrary, the law of personal jurisdiction has blos­
somed into an incoherent and precarious doctrine that many commen­
tators have long vilified as being in need of reform.
8 
Notwithstanding this near-universal condemnation, the doctrine 
remains in place with no credible challenger appearing in the offing. 
3 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws treats the concept of judicial jurisdiction 
as having three elements: judicial jurisdiction of the state, notice and opportunity to he heard, 
and competence. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws at ch 3, Introductory Note. In this 
Article, I use the term "adjudicatory jurisdiction" to refer to the classic notion of personal or 
territorial jurisdiction, which subsumes the requirement of proper notice and hearing. See Part 
H.B. Subject matter jurisdiction or "competence" is not a topic addressed in this Article; thus, the 
analysis of adjudicatory jurisdiction contained herein will not embrace that topic. 
4 95 US 714 (1877) (finding no jurisdiction over a nonresident without sufficient notice). 
5 326 US 310 (1945) (finding jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation with sufficient 
minimum contacts and notice). 
6 Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 Harv L Rev 1121, 1136-63 (1966). 
7 326 US at 316. 
8 In a recent article, Professor James Weinstein aptly identified the body of commentary 
condemning the jurisdictional doctrine of International Shoe. See James Weinstein, The Federal 
Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 Va L Rev 
169, 171-72 n 5 (2004). 
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Although the resilience of the doctrine over the course of the sixty­
plus years since International Shoe would tend to inspire resignation, 
the fight is not worth giving up yet. The difficulties-both legal and 
practical-that the confused personal jurisdiction doctrine spawns are 
too great to permit acquiescence. The complexity and lack of funda­
mental soundness characteristic of contemporary doctrine has re­
sulted in a hopeless unpredictability that fosters regular jurisdictional 
challenges,9 turning what should be a "simple, threshold question" into 
one of the more vigorously litigated issues between parties.
10 
It is with the hope of once and for all providing a viable alterna­
tive to contemporary jurisdictional doctrine that the Court can em­
brace that I undertake this effort to suggest a reconception of the law 
of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, calls for the Court" to revamp its law 
of personal jurisdiction are not new.12 However, it is by identifying the 
proper role of due process within jurisdictional doctrine and reassert­
ing the primary relevance of state sovereignty and interstate federal­
ism that I intend to clarify the proper basis for and limitations on a 
state court's exercise of jurisdiction over a civil dispute involving non­
resident defendants in a manner not previously achieved. 
Part I of this Article rehearses the law of personal jurisdiction as 
it now stands, doing so only briefly in light of the numerous efforts of 
9 See Robert H. Abrams and Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the 
Control of State Court Jurisdicrion, 69 Minn L Rev 75, 83-84 (1984) ("[T]he bases for the Court's 
limitations of state court jurisdiction are invariably muddled . ... [N]o clear guidelines [have] 
emerge[d]. When this failure is coupled with the Court's own confusion, prediction of future due 
process applications becomes impossible."). 
10 Walter W. Heiser, A "Minimum Interest" Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 35 Wake 
Forest L Rev 915, 917 (2000). See also Pierre Riou, General Jurisdiction over Foreign Corpora­
tions: All That Glitters Is Not Gold Issue Mining, 14 Rev Litig 741,803 (1995) ("How much litiga­
tion is now devoted merely to deciding whether a defendant is amenable to personal jurisdic­
tion? Amorphous concepts of fairness, reasonableness, convenience, purposeful availment, and 
balancing of interests should not be allowed to complicate the determination of this threshold 
issue. "); Abrams and Dimond, 69 Minn L Rev at 84 (cited in note 9) ("Ultimately, this morass 
generates costly and wasteful threshold litigation over state court exercises of jurisdiction."); 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 S Ct Rev 241, 283 
("[T]he vagueness of the minimum-contacts general principle can make jurisdictional litigation 
uncertain at the trial level and frequent at the appellate level."). 
11 I do not disturb the status of the Court as the superintendent of personal jurisdiction 
doctrine, although it has been argued that Congress-if it chose-could regulate state court 
jurisdiction via its powers under the Full Faith and Credit Oause of the Constitution. US Const 
Art IV,§ 1. See Abrams and Dimond, 69 Minn L Rev at 87-109 (cited in note 9), for a proposal 
for how Congress could legislate control over state court jurisdiction through its powers under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
12 See, for example, Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 
68 Mo L Rev 753, 754 (2003) ("The Supreme Court should again start afresh. A workable test 
placed between the extreme rigidity of Pennoyer and the extreme malleability of International 
Shoe is needed."). 
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previous authors who have summarized and restated that material. 13 
Part II then addresses the proper role that the Due Process Clause has 
to play in determining a state's adjudicatory jurisdiction. It concludes 
that due process serves three functions in the jurisdictional realm: it 
creates the requirement of jurisdiction, it requires that adequate no­
tice of the action be afforded to the defendant as a prerequisite to a 
proper assertion of state court jurisdiction, and it protects defendants 
against arbitrary assertions of jurisdiction as a matter of substantive 
due process. Part III addresses the relevance of state sovereign au­
thority to adjudicatory jurisdiction. This Part finds that notions of state 
sovereignty and interstate federalism and the derivative principles of 
domestic omnipotence and extraterritorial impotence articulated in 
Pennoyer are central to determining adjudicatory jurisdiction. These 
notions serve as the basis for limiting a state's jurisdiction over dis­
putes involving nonconsenting, nonresident defendants to those in 
which the state has a legitimate governmental interest. Part IV formu­
lates these findings into the central proposal of this Article, that the 
law of personal jurisdiction be revised to permit a state court to hear 
and render a binding judgment in a case involving a nonconsenting, 
nonresident defendant not served with process within the state's bor­
ders so long as the defendant has been given proper notice of the ac­
tion and the state has a legitimate interest in the dispute. Part V tests 
the efficacy of this approach by revisiting some of the Court's seminal 
personal jurisdiction cases, and is followed by a Conclusion. 
I. THE CURRENT LAW OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
The landscape of contemporary personal jurisdiction doctrine is 
familiar terrain. Its roots lie in International Shoe Co, which in turn 
was a revision of the doctrine of Pennoyer. The Pennoyer Court an­
nounced the requirement that in-state service was a fundamental pre­
requisite to a state court's jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, 
suggesting that such was not only the product of the international 
public law limitations on state sovereignty" but also a requirement of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Although 
reliance on the Due Process Clause was of dubious legitimacy given 
that the facts in Pennoyer occurred before the ratification of the Four-
13 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: 
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 UC Davis L Rev 19, 25-87 (1990), for a thor­
ough review of the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. 
14 95 US at 722-24. 
15 Id at 733 (holding that due process of law requires that "if [a suit] involves merely a 
determination of the personal liability of the defendant, he must be brought within [the tribu­
nal's] jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance"). 
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teenth Amendment,1
6 
the Court subsequently endorsed the constitu­
tional status of the decision in Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v 
Menefee." 
By 1945, the notion that the law of state court jurisdiction was a 
matter with which the Due Process Clause was concerned was not 
fairly open to challenge. When the Court addressed itself to the doc­
trine of personal jurisdiction in International Shoe, the doctrine lim­
ited the reach of state courts to defendants who were either served 
with process within state borders, who had consented either explicitly or 
implicitly to jurisdiction," or to those deemed to be "present" within the 
state by virtue of "doing business" there.'
9 
In light of the strain per­
sonal jurisdiction doctrine had endured over the sixty-seven years 
since the decision in Pennoyer-specifically, the challenge that the rise 
of the corporation posed for a doctrine based on in-state presence,2° 
and the imprecision of the concept of "doing business" -the Court 
16 Mitchell obtained his judgment in February 1866. See id at 719. The Fourteenth 
Amendment was proposed by Congress on June 13, 1866, and was ratified on July 28, 1868. 
USCA Const Amend XIV, Historical Notes. 
17 237 US 189 (1915). The majority concluded: 
Equally well settled is it that the courts of one State cannot without a violation of the due 
process clause, extend their authority beyond their jurisdiction so as to condemn the resi­
dent of another State when neither his person nor his property is within the jurisdiction of 
the court rendering the judgment, since that doctrine was long ago established by the deci­
sion in Pennoyer . . .  and has been without deviation upheld by a long line of cases. 
Id at 193. 
18 See Hess v Pawloski, 274 US 352, 356-57 (1927) (describing the use of a state's highways 
as "implied consent " to the county registrar acting as the out-of-state driver's agent for service of 
process). 
19 See Philadelphia and Reading Railway Co v McKibbin, 243 US 264, 265 (1917) ("A 
foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence of con­
sent, only if it is doing business within the State in such manner and to such extent as to warrant 
the inference that it is present there."). And also, four years earlier: 
[TJhis case is to be decided upon the principles which have heretofore prevailed in deter­
mining whether a foreign corporation is doing business within the district in such sense as 
to subject it to suit therein . . . .  In a general way it may be said that the business must be 
such in character and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected 
itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which it is served and in which it is bound 
to appear when a proper agent has been served with process. 
St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co of Texas v Alexander, 227 US 218, 227 (1913). 
20 The International Shoe Court addressed the issue thus: 
Since the corporate personality is a fiction , although a fiction intended to be acted upon as 
though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an individual its "presence" without, as well as 
within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by 
those who are authorized to act for it. 
326 US at 316 (internal citation omitted). See also Hutchinson v Chase & Gilbert, 45 F2d 139, 140 
(2d Cir 1930) ("The service of a capias subjects him de facto to such commands as its courts may 
utter, though in its stead a notice will usually serve. Such a theory is not really apposite to a 
corporation , however conceived, and it is only by analogy that it can be used."). 
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felt compelled to revise the doctrine substantially. The Court's revision 
supplanted the requirement of in-state service or presence with a re­
quirement of "minimum contacts" that were to serve as surrogates of 
presence.
2
1 Contacts would qualify as "minimum contacts" that could 
support jurisdiction depending on their "nature and quality" and their 
relationship, if any, to the underlying cause of action.
22 Systematic and 
continuous contacts that were substantial could support jurisdiction 
over a defendant regardless of the connection between the contacts and 
the claim.2.' However, single and isolated contacts would support juris­
diction only where they were related to the action." These assertions 
of jurisdiction would come to be known as general and specific juris­
diction, respectively.2.' 
Over time, the Court has adhered to the view that the Due Proc­
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment lies at the core of personal 
jurisdiction doctrine
26 
but has refined the details regarding what the 
clause requires. The current view is that due process requires purpose­
ful availment, which means that minimum contacts must be something 
that the defendant purposefully establishes with the forum state.
21 Due 
process also requires, under the current view, that assertions of juris­
diction be reasonable, which means that jurisdiction may not "offend 
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "
28 
This reason­
ableness requirement is given substance by a five-factor test applied in 
21 International Shoe, 326 US at 316 ("[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject 
a defendant to a judgment in personam . . .  he have certain minimum contacts with [the state) 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and sub­
stantial justice."'). 
22 Id at 318. 
23 ld at 317 -18. 
24 Id at 317 (noting that "single or isolated items of activities in a state .. . are not enough 
to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there"). 
25 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia SA v Hall, 466 US 408, 414--15 (1984) (outlin­
ing the criteria for general and specific jurisdiction); von Mehren and Trautman, 79 Harv L Rev 
at 1 136 (cited in note 6) (same). 
26 Insurance Corp of Ireland, Ltd v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US 694, 702--03 
n 10 (1982) ("[The Due Process] Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction require­
ment."). 
27 Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462 , 474 (1985). 
28 Asahi Metal Industry Co v Superior Coun, 480 US 102 , 113 (1987), quoting International 
Shoe, 326 US at 316. Though originally articulated as a unitary test whereby establishing the 
requisite minimum contacts would satisfy due process and permit the assertion of jurisdiction, 
the test has evolved into a bifurcated analysis treating minimum contacts and "fair play and 
substantial justice " as distinct inquiries. See Burger King, 471 US at 476 ("Once it has been de­
cided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State, these 
contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice."'). 
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Asahi Metal Industries Co v Superior Court" that considers "the bur­
den on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plain­
tiff's interest in obtaining relief,"
"° 
as well as "the interstate judicial 
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of contro­
versies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fun­
damental substantive social policies."
31 
The burden on defendants is 
typically given the most weight, with the plaintiffs' interests and state 
interests receiving a fair degree of consideration as well. Unfortu­
nately, neither the purposeful availment requirement nor all of the 
five factors articulated by the Court are true derivatives of the Due 
Process Clause. Rather, they are largely contrivances that the Court 
has developed as it has attempted to rationalize results under the doc­
trine from one decision to the next.
32 
The essential jurisdictional requi­
sites of due process are explored in Part II below. 
Regarding the relationship between state sovereignty, interstate 
federalism, and personal jurisdiction doctrine, the Court has vacillated 
between endorsement and rejection of the relevance of these two con­
cepts, giving varying degrees of weight
3
' or no weight to sovereignty 
and federalism as legitimate underpinnings of the law of personal ju­
risdiction. The most recent major jurisdictional decision of the Court 
seems to treat due process as the exclusive source of limitations on state 
29 480 US 102 (1987) (finding insufficient minimum contacts to support jurisdiction, and 
fracturing on whether introducing products into the stream of commerce is "purposeful avail­
ment" sufficient to subject a corporation to jurisdiction). 
30 Id at 113. 
31 Id (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court has not quite resolved how 
the minimum contacts and reasonableness prongs of the doctrine should interact, the general 
practice is to require defendants to make a showing of unreasonableness in the event that the 
plaintiff establishes the existence of minimum contacts. See Burger King, 471 US at 477 
("[W )here a defendant . .. seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the 
presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable."). 
32 Professor Kevin McMunigal describes the succession of the Court's personal jurisdiction 
decisions and resultant doctrinal development as a process of accumulation rather than evolu­
tion or refinement, arguing that the Court in each decision has simply "added new factors with­
out admitting that it was doing so, justifying the additions, relating them to any underlying pur­
pose, or attempting to assimilate the new factors with those found in International Shoe." Kevin 
C. McMunigal, Desen, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Juris­
diction, 108 Yale L J 189, 197 (1998). Professor Geoffrey Hazard was less charitable when he 
described the jurisdictional decisions following Pennoyer as "the palliation of Pennoyer's worst 
defects by improvisation." Hazard, 1965 S Ct Rev at 241--42 (cited in note 10). 
33 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 293 (1980) ("[W)e have 
never accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor 
could we. and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the Constitu­
tion."). 
34 See Burger King, 471 US at 472 n 13 (1985) ("Although this protection operates to re­
strict state power, it 'must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest pre­
served by the Due Process Clause' rather than as a function 'of federalism concerns."'), quoting 
Insurance Corp of Ireland, 456 US at 703 n 10. 
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court jurisdiction." However, as discussed below,
36 
state sovereign au­
thority plays a vital role in limiting the scope of a state's adjudicatory 
jurisdiction. Indeed, it is the Court's contemporary failure to embrace 
fully the relevance of state sovereign authority to personal jurisdiction 
that has enabled the Court to stray toward the current doctrine almost 
exclusively focused on the interests, intentions, and actions of defendants. 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that personal jurisdiction doc­
trine is almost exclusively concerned with the limits on state court ju­
risdiction. It has long been understood that the personal jurisdiction of 
federal courts is not limited in the same manner as is the jurisdiction 
of state courts; Congress is free to provide federal courts with nation­
wide jurisdiction over all parties served with process anywhere within 
the United States
31 
and has so provided in several circumstances.
38 
In­
deed, a much simpler system would be one that simply permitted ju­
risdiction based on nationwide service of process, leaving the federal 
venue statute to sort out the proper judicial district in which a case 
should be brought.39 However, Congress has determined that the gen­
eral rule is that the personal jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to 
that of courts of the states in which the federal courts are located.'° 
Thus, so long as that continues to be the case, the issue of the jurisdic-
35 See Burnham v Superior Coun, 495 US 604, 609 (1990) (noting that after adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that "the judgment of a court lacking personal jurisdic­
tion violated the Due Process Oause of the Fourteenth Amendment "). 
36 See Part III. 
37 Mississippi Publishing Corp v Murphree, 326 US 438, 442 (1946); Robertson v Railroad 
Labor Board, 268 US 619, 622 (1925). One commentator has suggested that Congress has the 
authority to authorize state courts to exercise nationwide jurisdiction in certain cases. See 
Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 Tex L Rev 1589, 1619 (1992) 
(suggesting that Congress can constitutionally authorize state courts to exercise personal juris­
diction through nationwide service and national contacts). 
38 See, for example, Clayton Act, 15 USC § 25 (2000) (providing for nationwide jurisdiction 
of restraining violations); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 USC 
§ 1132(e)(2) (2000) (providing that process may be served in any district where the defendant 
resides or may be found); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78aa (2000) (providing 
that process may be served where the defendant resides or may be found). 
39 A similar suggestion was forwarded by Professor Hazard long ago: 
(I]t could have been provided that diversity would be deemed to exist if any of the parties 
was diverse in citizenship from another party; that venue be sited in the federal district 
court in which the action could most conveniently be tried; and that federal process reach 
the parties to be joined wherever they might be. 
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Interstate Venue, 74 Nw U L  Rev 711, 712-13 (1979). See also Edward L. 
Barrett, Jr., Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 Vand 
L Rev 608,635 (1954) ("(W]ith nation-wide service of process, [the plaintiff) will be able to get 
personal jurisdiction of all parties in any district where venue is proper."). 
40 F RCP 4(k)(l)(A). This limitation on the reach of federal courts was originally reflected 
in the Process Act. See Process Act of 1789, ch 21 § 2, 1 Stat 93 (1789). 
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tional reach of state courts will remain the central concern of courts 
and scholars. 
II. DUE PROCESS AND JURISDICTION 
Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
has much to do with a state court's adjudicatory jurisdiction, the cur­
rent requirements that the Court has developed and imposed in the 
name of the clause generally go beyond what due process truly re­
quires. That is, the requirements of purposeful minimum contacts and 
reasonableness measured by the Asahi factors are not the inevitable 
mandates of due process. Rather, they are a patchwork of ideas cre­
ated and cobbled together by the Court over time as it has sought ei­
ther to explain or to clarify its previous statements about the doctrine. 
However, by closely analyzing the roots of personal jurisdiction doc­
trine in due process and state sovereign authority, we can derive the 
essential requisites of a state's proper assertion of jurisdiction. This 
Part explores the meaning of due process to discover what it requires 
in the jurisdictional realm. Part III considers the relationship between 
state sovereign authority and adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
A. Due Process and the Requirement of Jurisdiction 
Beginning with the most basic contribution of due process to ad­
judicatory jurisdiction, the guarantee contained within the Due Proc­
ess Clause-that no state may deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law-ensures that a court must have 
proper jurisdiction before it may render a binding and enforceable 
judgment. As the Court put it in Pennoyer: "[P]roceedings in a court of 
justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over 
whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of 
law."" Indeed, it is only those judgments rendered by state courts hav­
ing jurisdiction that will be entitled to recognition in other states un­
der the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution" and its im­
plementing statute:" " [T]he act [is] applicable only when the court 
rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the parties and of the sub­
ject-matter."
44 
This right of individuals to be protected against exer-
41 95 US at 733. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 291 (1980) 
("Due process requires that the defendant . . .  be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the 
court."); Kulka v Superior Court, 436 US 84. 91 (1978) ("It has long been the rule that a valid 
judgment imposing a personal obligation or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by 
a court having jurisdiction over the person of the defendant."). 
42 US Const Art IV, § 1 .  
43  28 use § 1 738 (2000). 
44 Pennoyer, 95 US at 729, citing M'Elmoyle v Cohen, 38 (13 Pet) US 312 (1839). 
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cises of power in the absence of jurisdiction is a substantive due proc­
ess right. Thus, substantive due process requires adjudicatory jurisdic­
tion and, since ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Due 
Process Clause provides persons with a guarantee that this requirement 
will not be ignored by states.4
5 
This role of the Due Process Clause 
should be beyond dispute. 
B. Due Process and the Right to Notice and Hearing 
Another uncontroversial role that due process plays in determin­
ing adjudicatory jurisdiction is requiring that state courts provide de­
fendants with proper notice before jurisdiction will obtain: "The exis­
tence of personal jurisdiction . . .  depends upon the presence of rea­
sonable notice to the defendant that an action has been brought."
46 
Relatedly, the opportunity to be heard has also been deemed to be a 
critical due process right that must be respected for a court's judgment 
to be treated as valid and binding on a defendant." However, it is no­
tice that is viewed as a jurisdictional requisite, with the opportunity to 
be heard serving more as a procedural guarantee that must be af­
forded by a court once it asserts jurisdiction. But the two rights are 
inextricably intertwined: "The fundamental requisite of due process of 
law is the opportunity to be heard . . . .  And it is to this end, of course, 
that summons or equivalent notice is employed."
48 
The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment brought about an 
express constitutional guarantee of due process upon which the Court 
could base the requirements of notice and the opportunity to be 
heard. These requirements were long understood as the basic ele­
ments of due process that, prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, de­
rived from natural law.4
9 
Since the ratification of that amendment, the 
Court has looked to the Due Process Clause rather than common law 
understandings as the source of authority for enforcing this require-
45 See Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdic­
tion and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 Wash L Rev 479, 503 (1987) ("[Substantive due process] 
rights were not created by the fourteenth amendment. Rather, the fourteenth amendment pro­
vided the mechanism for protecting these rights from intrusions by the states. "), citing Powell v 
Pennsylvania, 127 US 678, 690 (1888) (Field dissenting). 
46 Kulka, 436 US at 91. 
47 Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 333 (1976) ("The fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."'). 
48 Grannis v Ordean, 234 US 385, 394 (1914). See also D'Arcy v Ketchum, 52 US (11 How) 
165, 174  (1850) ("That countries foreign to our own disregard a judgment merely against the 
person, where he has not been served with process nor had a day in court, is the familiar rule; 
national comity is never thus extended. "). 
49 See, for example, Lafayette Insurance Co v French, 59 US (18 How) 404, 407 (1855) 
(referring to "that principle of natural justice which forbids condemnation without opportunity 
for defence "). 
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ment, still presumably deriving the content of the requirement (notice 
and the opportunity to be heard) from the original, preconstitutional 
natural law source.� In the words of the Court in Mullane v Central 
Hanover Bank and Trust Co," "Many controversies have raged about 
the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there 
can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of 
life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and 
opportunity for hearing."
52 
Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that due process 
has long required that defendants be given proper notice, sufficient to 
permit the opportunity to be heard, before a court's assertion of juris­
diction over the matter will be recognized. 
C. Due Process and Convenience 
The minimum imperatives of due process just discussed-that a 
court must have jurisdiction to render a binding and enforceable 
judgment and that in order to have jurisdiction the defendant must 
first be given proper notice of the pendency of the action-are not 
controversial. The debate lies, however, with the question of whether 
due process imposes any additional limits on adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
One prime candidate for due process protection within jurisdictional 
doctrine is the notion of convenience to the defendant, given the 
prominent place accorded this issue within the contemporary law of 
personal jurisdiction. However, the constitutionalization of conven­
ience turns out to be one of the greatest flaws of personal jurisdiction 
doctrine as currently conceived. 
The Court has clearly made inconvenience to defendants a cen­
tral concern of the Due Process Clause within the doctrine of personal 
jurisdiction. One of the "two related, but distinguishable functions" that 
the minimum contacts requirement performs, according to the Court, is 
that "[i]t protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a 
distant or inconvenient forum."
53 
First among the Asahi reasonable­
ness factors is consideration of "the burden on the defendant.""' The 
Court has explained the degree of burden that causes concern by stat­
ing, " [J]urisdictional rules may not be employed in such a way as to 
50 I have borrowed the terms "source of authority " and "source of content " from Professor 
James Weinstein. Weinstein, 90 Va L Rev at 182 ( cited in note 8). 
51 339 US 306 (1950) (finding notice by publication insufficient to support jurisdiction 
where the defendant's whereabouts are known). 
52 Id at 313. 
53 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at 291-92. See also id at 292 ("The protection against 
inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of 'reasonableness' or 'fairness."'). 
54 480 US at 113. 
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make litigation 'so gravely difficult and inconvenient' that a party un­
fairly is at a 'severe disadvantage' in comparison to his opponent."
55 
Commentators have endorsed this view as well. Professor Martin 
Redish has labeled this type of burden "litigation inconvenience," a 
concept that includes "the imposition of significant burdens and ex­
pense, resulting from the need to travel to the forum in question and 
to transport evidence and witnesses long distances."
56 
Professors von 
Mehren and Trautman long ago indicated their view that "very strong 
considerations of convenience" should be considered when evaluating 
the reasonableness and fairness of an assertion of jurisdiction.
51 
Other 
commentators have also suggested that the Due Process Clause is 
relevant as a measure protecting defendants against inconvenient or 
burdensome litigation.
58 
Notwithstanding the Court's longstanding adherence to a belief 
that inconvenience to the defendant is relevant to a due process analy­
sis of personal jurisdiction, or commentators' infatuation with the link 
between fairness and convenience, there is no basis for asserting the 
existence of any procedural or substantive due process protection 
against litigation inconvenience save for the ipse dixit of its propo­
nents. The argument in favor of a connection seems to be that if the 
Due Process Clause protects defendants against "injustice," and if 
"litigation inconvenience" and "the imposition of significant burdens 
and expense" on defendants constitute injustice, then burden and in­
convenience is something defendants may not be subjected to per the 
55 Burger King, 471 US at 478 (internal citations omitted). 
56 Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical 
Evaluation, 75 Nw U L  Rev 1112, 1133 (1981). Indeed, Professor Redish would revise the doc­
trine by making litigation inconvenience the primary concern of the due process clause, finding 
an assertion of jurisdiction to be unconstitutional where "meaningful inconvenience" -
determined with reference to the factors used to evaluate the propriety of a forum non conven­
iens dismissal-to the defendant is present and outweighs the interests of the plaintiff and the 
forum state. Id at 1137-38. 
57 Von Mehren and Trautman, 79 Harv L Rev at 1167 (cited in note 6). 
58 See, for example, Peter Hay, Judicial Jurisdiction over Foreign-Country Corporate De­
fendants- Comments on Recent Case Law, 63 Or L Rev 431, 431-33 (1984) (positing that the 
avoidance of extreme inconvenience is the most important consideration within personal juris­
diction doctrine); Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdiction of 
State Courts: Time for Change, 63 Or L Rev 485, 527-28 (1984) (suggesting that minimum con­
tacts and notions of federalism in jurisdictional doctrine should be relegated to "the dustbin of 
history," replaced by a focus on the burden on defendants); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional 
Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full 
Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses (Part Two), 14 Creighton L Rev 735, 846 (1981): 
The primary "territorial "  rule that the Court should follow . . .  is that a court has jurisdiction 
to adjudicate an action against any defendant , unless the defendant demonstrates that the 
relative burdens imposed by suit in the particular court are so great that the defendant is, as 
a practical matter, unable to defend there adequately. 
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Due Process Clause.'• The problem with this syllogism -that all injus­
tice is prohibited by due process; burden and inconvenience are un­
just; therefore, due process prohibits burden and inconvenience-is 
that its minor premise is false. 
Inconvenience and burden are not unjust, at least not in the sense 
contemplated by due process. The concept of due process embodies 
the substantive and procedural protections traditionally thought to be 
requisites of a fair and just exercise of state authority that works a 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.61) Two of those requisites, as 
previously discussed, include the requirement that a court have juris­
diction before it may be permitted to render a binding judgment and 
that the party to be bound be given sufficient notice of, and right to 
present a defense in, the action.°' And, as will be discussed in Part 11.D, 
due process also protects defendants against arbitrary governmental 
action, which serves as an additional due process limitation on state 
assertions of jurisdiction. Other requirements of due process beyond 
the jurisdictional level are those that protect fundamental fairness,
62 
such as the right to a hearing before an impartial decisionrnaker
03 
and 
the right to have a judgment rendered only on the basis of informa­
tion presented to that decisionmaker.
04 
Judgments that are the product 
of a process that complies with the substantive and procedural due 
process requirements just mentioned have given the defendant all 
process that is due; any burden or inconvenience ordinarily will be 
simply a consequence of litigation that one who is sued unfortunately 
59 See Redish, 75 Nw U L Rev at 1133 (cited in note 56). 
60 Toe Court has explained the purpose of the due process requirement as follows: 
Toe constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a 
fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The pur­
pose of this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its pur­
pose, more particularly, is to protect his use and possession of property from arbitrary en­
croachment-to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property, a dan­
ger that is especially great when the State seizes goods simply upon the application of and 
for the benefit of a private party. So viewed, the prohibition against the deprivation of 
property without due process of law reflects the high value, embedded in our constitutional 
and political history, that we place on a person's right to enjoy what is his, free of govern­
mental interference. 
Fuentes v Shevin, 407 US 67, 80-81 (1972). 
61 See id at 80 ("For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process 
has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that 
they may enjoy that right they must first be notified."'), quoting Baldwin v Hale, 68 US (1 Wall) 
223, 233 (1863). 
62 Quill Corp v Nonh Dakota, 504 US 298, 312 (1992). 
63 Weiss v United States, 510 US 163, 178 (1994). 
64 Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 271 (1970) ( "[T)he decisionmaker's conclusion as to a 
recipient's eligibility must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing."). 
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must endure,
05 
not a concern that undermines the constitutionality of 
the entire enterprise. 
Inconvenience to defendants does not find itself among this list of 
traditional concerns of the Due Process Clause because the experi­
ence of litigation inconvenience does not in itself deprive a defendant 
of the fundamental requisites of a fair deprivation of property or un­
dermine our faith in its soundness; rather, inconvenience simply makes 
the deprivation a potentially more troublesome affair.
06 Furthermore, 
there is simply no historical concern over convenience as an addi­
tional component of due process, other than the Court's unprece­
dented infusion of such concerns into the doctrine in International 
Shoe, where the Court simply passed along the unsupported formula­
tion regarding convenience written by Judge Learned Hand in an ear­
lier Second Circuit case.
61 
Justice Black was right to take issue with this 
portion of the International Shoe opinion when he wrote, "Nor can I 
stretch the meaning of due process so far as to authorize this Court to 
deprive a State of the right to afford judicial protection to its citizens 
on the ground that it would be more 'convenient' for the corporation 
to be sued somewhere else."
68 
So too was Chief Justice Warren correct 
to note that the jurisdictional restrictions on state courts were not 
simply a guarantee against litigation inconvenience but were rather "a 
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective 
States."
69 
Given the lack of a historical basis for a convenience-guarding 
conception of due process and the absence of a connection between 
convenience and the fundamental requisites of a fair governmental 
deprivation, it is difficult to understand the basis of the Court's posi-
65 One commentator aptly stated: "It is appropriate to presume, at least in limine, that 
plaintiff is the wronged party and defendant the wrongdoer. If one must bear the inconvenience 
of a foreign forum, therefore, it should be the defendant." David E. Seidelson, Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts Hearing Federal Cases: An Examination of the Propriety of the Limitations Im­
posed by Venue Restrictions, 37 Geo Wash L Rev 82 , 85 (1968). 
66 Consider Yakus v United States, 321 US 414, 437 n 5 (1944) (stating that inconvenience 
to petitioners with grievances against the wartime Price Administrator resulting from requiring 
them to make their objection in Washington, D.C., was not a violation of due process because the 
petitioner's physical presence was not needed unless there was a hearing, and in that event, the 
Administrator could lay venue for the hearing anywhere in the country). 
67 The International Shoe Court wrote: 
Th[e] demands [of due process] may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the 
state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of govern­
ment, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An 'es­
timate of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a trial away from 
its 'home' or principal place of business is relevant in this connection. 
International Shoe, 326 US at 317, quoting Hutchinson v Chase & Gilbert, 45 F2d 139, 141 (2d Cir 
1930). 
68 International Shoe, 326 US at 325 (Black concurring). 
69 Hanson v Denckla,357 US 235, 251 (1958). 
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tion that the Due Process Clause "protects the defendant against the 
burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum."
10 
Theoretically, the burdens caused by the assertion of jurisdiction 
might be so oppressive as to threaten the defendant's ability to obtain 
a fair trial, but in such a situation, the potential threat would be to the 
defendant's right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard, not to 
some right to be protected against burden and inconvenience." More 
important, however, such a degree of burden is hard to perceive be­
yond the realm of the imagination. Indeed, the lack of constitutional 
significance for the notion of inconvenience and burden to defendants 
is made clear by the fact that burden and inconvenience are concepts 
that are increasingly meaningless in modem times. The Supreme Court 
acknowledged long ago in McGee v International Life Insurance Co
12 
the decreasing burdens associated with litigation when it wrote, 
" [M]odem transportation and communication have made it much less 
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he 
engages in economic activity."" This statement is even truer nearly 
fifty years later. A defendant forced to defend itself in a distant state 
may easily employ local counsel to appear on its behalf and manage 
the pretrial aspects of the case without any appearance on the part of 
the defendant. Modem communications technology, including email, 
the Internet, mobile phones, and fax machines, enable defendants and 
their counsel to communicate at any time across great distances to 
discuss and advance their cases. In the rare event that a trial actually 
occurs
74 
and a defendant desires or is required to appear personally, 
modem aviation provides a rapid and affordable means of moving 
from one's home state to distant others. Professor (now Dean) Patrick 
Borchers summed up these points well when he wrote: 
The "inconvenience" rationale depends upon the elaborate 
metaphor of a civil party temporarily relocating to the forum 
70 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at 292. See also id ("The protection against inconven­
ient litigation is typically described in terms of 'reasonableness' or 'fairness."'). 
71 See Heiser, 35 Wake Forest L Rev at 935 (cited in note 10) ("[T]he Due Process Clause 
should preclude jurisdiction where the defendant can show that trial in the chosen forum will be 
so manifestly and gravely inconvenient that the defendant will be effectively deprived of a mean­
ingful day in court."'); Abrams and Dimond, 69 Minn L Rev at 76--77 (cited in note 9) ("State 
court assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction violate these [due process] guarantees when the 
inconvenience and expense of responding to the suits prevent defendants from being heard and 
from participating in fundamentally fair proceedings."'). 
72 355 US 220 (1957) (finding that an insurance contract with a domiciliary created suffi­
cient minimum contacts with the state to sustain jurisdiction over the corporation). 
73 Id at 223. 
74 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial:An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Couns, 1 J Empirical Legal Stud 459, 462-{j3 (2004) (reporting that trials ac­
counted for only 1.8 percent of dispositions in all cases in 2002, down from 1 1 .5 percent in 1962). 
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state to defend or pursue the case. In reality, civil litigation does 
not operate in this manner at all. Depositions and other discov­
ery devices take place anywhere the parties designate, and are 
not tied to the forum. The only events tied to the forum are those 
requiring judicial supervision, such as pretrial motions. Motions 
require the presence of counsel, but a party is free to hire a law­
yer close to the courthouse. The only time a party is likely to 
travel is in the improbable event that the case goes to trial." 
Certainly today-well beyond 1957 when the Court spoke in 
McGee, and deep into the age of the jet engine, the fax machine, and 
the Internet -it is hard to imagine any remaining vitality to notions of 
inconvenience and burden to travel within the United States that can 
rise to levels of constitutional concern. This is particularly so for cor­
porate defendants accustomed to operating on a national if not an 
international level. A construct of burden and inconvenience that has 
more substance in the realm of theory and imagination than in reality 
cannot plausibly claim any legitimate position as a central component 
of jurisdictional doctrine. 
Does the lack of any constitutional protection against litigation 
inconvenience mean that convenience bears no relationship to juris­
dictional analysis? In a word, yes. Adjudicatory jurisdiction does not 
depend on convenience to the defendant. Jurisdiction is delimited by 
due process and, as we shall see in the next Part, a state's sovereign 
authority. Thus, if defendant convenience is not safeguarded by due 
process, then the only remaining possible source of protection would 
be some inherent limitation on state sovereign authority. But there is 
no such limitation; the only limits on a state's sovereign authority are 
those imposed by the Constitution and those principles of public in­
ternational law that are of continuing validity in the wake of the adop­
tion of the Constitution. Neither the Constitution nor public interna­
tional law recognize convenience to defendants as a constraint on the 
scope of a state's sovereign authority. Thus, in the absence of any con­
stitutional protection against inconvenience and burden, there is no 
proper place for such concerns within the doctrine of personal juris­
diction. 
To the extent that a state's exercise of jurisdiction results in in­
convenience and burden to the defendant, the doctrines of venue and 
forum non conveniens have long been in place to address such con­
cerns at a subconstitutional, nonjurisdictional level.'• That is, although 
75 Borchers, 24 UC Davis L Rev at 95 (cited in note 13). 
76 A similar observation has been made by Professor Douglas McFarland. See McFarland, 
68 Mo L Rev at 798 (cited in note 12). 
2006] Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis 633 
inconvenience and burden will not suffice to deprive a state of the 
authority to exercise jurisdiction over a given matter, such factors may 
be considered as the basis for transferring the case to a more conven­
ient forum where such a transfer is possible, or dismissing the case 
altogether where another more convenient forum exists outside of the 
current forum's judicial system.n Indeed, the Court has endorsed the 
notion that a defendant's concerns regarding the burden associated 
with defending in a particular forum generally may be addressed by 
recourse to doctrines besides personal jurisdiction. As stated in Burger 
King Corp v Rudzewicz:
1
" "Most such considerations usually may be 
accommodated through means short of finding jurisdiction unconsti­
tutional. . . .  [A] defendant claiming substantial inconvenience may 
seek a change of venue."
1
• The rejection of convenience as a concern 
of the Due Process Clause thus does not mean that defendants must 
be subjected to litigating in unduly burdensome venues. Rather, it sim­
ply means that defendants will not be able to cite inconvenience as a 
basis for denying the jurisdictional authority of a forum but instead may 
use inconvenience only as a means to move the case to a preferred 
venue, where appropriate. 
In sum, although convenience of the parties may be a valid con­
cern that courts should seek to accommodate, there is nothing within 
due process that entitles defendants to convenience. Thus, there is no 
place for considerations of convenience and burden within a proper 
analysis of adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
D .  Due Process and Arbitrary Governmental Action 
Is there more to substantive due process as it relates to the ques­
tion of adjudicatory jurisdiction beyond the mere requirement of ju­
risdiction? Current jurisdictional doctrine has created a formidable sub­
stantive due process right, namely the right to be subjected to jurisdic­
tion in states only with which one has minimum contacts such that the 
exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice."' Other scholars have aptly and ably articulated 
the clear proposition that the current role ascribed to the Due Process 
77 One commentator has noted: 
The fact that adjudication of the defendant's rights in the forum is not so outrageous as to 
be unconstitutional does not mean it is wise. The defendant may be able to show that suit in 
another available forum will be more convenient for the parties and witnesses and will 
avoid placing unnecessary burdens and expenses on local courts. 
Weintraub. 63 Or L Rev at 523 (cited in note 58). 
78 471 us 462 (1985). 
79 ld at 477. 
80 International Shoe, 326 US at 316. 
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Clause within the law of personal jurisdiction is flatly inappropriate 
and unsupportable.81 Although I generally agree with those commen­
tators who question the soundness of the asserted linkage between the 
contemporary minimum contacts requirement and due process, I do 
not go so far as to repudiate any further jurisdictional role for the Due 
Process Clause beyond requiring personal jurisdiction and notice that 
protects the opportunity to be heard. Rather, it is my view the Court's 
imposition of a requirement of purposeful minimum contacts was in­
spired by what is indeed a proper due process limitation on jurisdic­
tion: state assertions of jurisdiction may not be arbitrary. 
The protection against arbitrary state action lies at the heart of 
the Court's original formulation in International Shoe that a state must 
have some relationship with a defendant such that the assertion of 
jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fairness. This is diffi­
cult to discern, however, because the sources from which the Court 
crafted its standard in International Shoe were not concerned with 
protecting defendants against arbitrary governmental action but 
rather emphasized the status of notice and the opportunity to be 
heard as requisites to the exercise of judicial jurisdiction. In Interna­
tional Shoe the Court wrote, "[D]ue process requires only that in or­
der to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not 
present within [the forum], he have certain minimum contacts with it 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional no­
tions of fair play and substantial justice.' "
82 
For this proposition, the 
Court cited Milliken v Meyer"3 and McDonald v Mabee.
84 
But both of 
these cases concerned themselves only with the sufficiency of service, 
specifically whether the method of service employed satisfied the re­
quirement of the Due Process Clause that the defendant be given 
proper notice of the action. In McDonald, Justice Holmes wrote, "To 
dispense with personal service the substitute that is most likely to 
reach the defendant is the least that ought to be required if substantial 
justice is to be done.""
5 In Milliken the Court built upon this endorse­
ment of substituted service "most likely to reach the defendant" by 
stating: 
[Substituted service's] adequacy so far as due process is con­
cerned is dependent on whether or not the form of substituted 
service provided for [in] such cases and employed is reasonably 
81 See, for example, Borchers, 24 UC Davis L Rev at 87-105 (cited in note 13) (advocating 
that the Court should no longer regard personal jurisdiction as an issue of constitutional law). 
82 326 US at 316. 
83 311 us 457 (1940). 
84 243 us 90 (1917). 
85 Id at 92 (emphasis added). 
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calculated to give [the defendant] actual notice of the proceed­
ings and an opportunity to be heard. If it is, the traditional no­
tions of fair play and substantial justice . . . implicit in due process 
are satisfied.
86 
How the International Shoe Court leapt from these statements 
regarding a linkage between due process and adequate notice to its 
statement that the jurisdiction of a court to render an in personam 
judgment against a defendant requires minimum contacts equaling 
fair play and substantial justice is unclear."' 
Nevertheless, the Court was on to something. The Court's in­
stincts were correct in declaring that there must be a connection be­
tween the state and the defendant in order for our traditional concep­
tion of "substantial justice" not to be offended. That is because sub­
stantive due process also protects defendants against deprivations of 
life, liberty, or property that are arbitrary: " [T]he Due Process Clause 
contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful 
government actions 'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used 
to implement them."'
88 
What does that mean for jurisdiction? Jurisdic­
tional power must be limited to disputes involving matters of proper 
local concern,
89 
which in turn means that a state at a minimum must 
have some rational connection with a dispute such that some legiti­
mate interest is implicated before its jurisdiction over that dispute can 
be recognized. This formulation bears much resemblance to the due 
process standard the Court has crafted in the choice-of-law context: 
"[F]or a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally 
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or sig­
nificant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice 
of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."
"' 
The resem­
blance is not coincidental." With inconvenience to defendants proven 
86 311 US at 463 (emphasis added). 
87 See McFarland, 68 Mo L Rev at 757-ol (cited in note 12), for a more thorough review of 
the precedential origins of the central minimum contacts formulation of International Shoe . 
88 Zinermon v Burch, 494 US 1 13, 125 (1990) , quoting Daniels v Williams, 474 US 327, 331 
(1986). See also Daniels, 474 US at 331 ("[T]he Due Process Clause, like its forebear in the 
Magna Carta . . .  was intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers 
of government.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Fuentes, 407 US at 80--81 (highlighting the 
connection between the right to a fair hearing and the protection against arbitrary governmental 
deprivations). 
89 The phrase "matters of proper local concern" is borrowed from Professor Hazard , who 
used these words to describe one of the central problems that Pennoyer addressed: the need "to 
restrict the judicial remedial power of the respective states to matters of proper local concern." 
Hazard , 1965 S Ct Rev at 245 (cited in note 10). 
90 Allstate Insurance Co v Hague, 449 US 302 , 312-13 (1981). 
91 Although the state interest analysis proposed herein is not identical to that of choice-of­
law doctrine, it is quite similar. See Part IV.B. Other commentators have suggested that the stan-
636 The University of Chicago Law Review [73:617 
to be a subconstitutional concem,
92 
defendants' only complaint against 
the assertion of jurisdiction by a state that has given proper notice and 
the opportunity to be heard can be that the state's assertion of juris­
diction is arbitrary. If a state has a legitimate interest in the dispute, 
however, no claim of arbitrariness can be made. Correspondingly, the 
absence of a legitimate governmental interest on the part of the state 
in a dispute will bar a state from exercising jurisdiction, per the Due 
Process Clause. 
Whether a state has a sufficient interest in a dispute is a question 
of the extent of its sovereign authority, not of due process. That is, al­
though due process requires that a state have an interest in the dis­
pute in order to prevent its assertion of jurisdiction from being arbi­
trary, due process does not help us identify whether a state's legiti­
mate interests are implicated." Part III will consider the role that state 
sovereign authority plays in giving substance to the state interest con­
cept within the context of jurisdictional doctrine. However, before 
moving to the next Part it will be helpful to briefly recapitulate what 
we have established thus far. Due process ultimately serves three 
functions relevant to adjudicatory jurisdiction: (1) it creates the re­
quirement that a court have jurisdiction before a binding judgment 
may be entered against a defendant; (2) it provides that jurisdiction 
will be valid only where proper notice preserving the opportunity to 
be heard has been afforded; and (3) it protects defendants against ar­
bitrary assertions of state jurisdiction, which minimally requires that a 
state have an interest in the dispute. Let us tum now to the substance 
of the state interest requirement, which is wholly a matter of state 
sovereign authority. 
dards should be one and the same. See , for example , Heiser , 35 Wake Forest L Rev at 955 (cited 
in note 10) (offering a proposal under which "the constitutional limitation on state court asser­
tions of personal jurisdiction would be the same as for choice-of-law determinations "); Court­
land H. Peterson , Proposals of Marriage between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 UC Davis L 
Rev 869, 882-83 (1981) (proposing the need for a symbiosis of judicial jurisdiction and choice-of­
law determinations). 
92 See Part 11.C. 
93 It has been argued that a similar interplay between due process as providing protection 
against illegitimate exercises of jurisdiction and state sovereign authority as the basis for deter­
mining legitimacy was present in Pennoyer: 
The role of the due process clause was passive; it bestowed on the defendant a right to re­
sist unjustified assertions of jurisdiction. The fourteenth amendment, however, did not state 
when jurisdiction in fact was unjustified. It therefore became essential for the Court to ar­
ticulate a jurisdictional justification. Drawing on principles of natural and international law, 
as well as the federalism element of the full faith and credit clause , the Court constructed 
the "territorialist" justification: jurisdiction is justified when a state acts on persons or things 
within its borders. 
Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 
65 Tex L Rev 689, 693 (1987) (internal citations omitted). 
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III. STATE SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION 
Having established the proper role of due process in jurisdic­
tional analysis and the absence of a role for considerations of defen­
dant inconvenience and burden in such an analysis, it remains to be 
determined whether the concepts of state sovereignty or interstate 
federalism are of any relevance to jurisdiction. Before exploring the 
relevance of these concepts, they must first be defined. State sover­
eignty simply refers to the status of states as independent sovereigns 
and the power that such sovereigns retain within the federal system 
established by the Constitution ... Interstate federalism refers to the 
relationship between states within our federal system, their status as 
coequal sovereigns, and the limits on state power that derive from that 
status." These two concepts go hand-in-hand: state sovereignty refers 
to the power of states, and interstate federalism imposes limits on that 
power.
96 
I shall use the term state sovereign authority to refer jointly to 
the concepts of state sovereignty and interstate federalism; that is, the 
term state sovereign authority as I intend to use it will refer to the 
sovereign power of states as limited by the existence of equally em­
powered comembers of our national federation. 
After initially giving a prominent role to state sovereign authority 
in Pennoyer, the Court has vacillated between giving it a central place 
94 See US Const Amend X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti­
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo­
ple."); Coyle v Smith, 221 US 559, 567 (1911) ("[E]ach [state is] competent to exert that residuum 
of sovereignty not delegated to the United States by the Constitution itself."); Pennoyer, 95 US 
at 722 ("The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent . . . .  But, 
except as restrained and limited by (the Constitution], they possess and exercise the authority of 
independent States, and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to 
them. "). See also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 907 (Foundation 3d ed 2000) 
("It is clear, however, that the Constitution does indeed presuppose the existence of the states as 
entities independent of the national government-not simply as a matter of historical reality, but 
as a matter of constitutional text and structure. "). 
95 Pennoyer states: 
[A State's] direct exertion of authority upon [persons], in an attempt to give ex-territorial 
operation to its laws, or to enforce an ex-territorial jurisdiction by its tribunals, would be 
deemed an encroachment upon the independence of the State in which the persons are 
domiciled or the property is situated, and be resisted as usurpation. 
95 US at 723. 
96 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson, 444 US 286, 293 (1980) ("(T]he Framers 
also intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty . . .. The sovereignty 
of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limita• 
tion express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth 
Amendment."). Consistent with other commentators, I reject the Court's assertion that the Four­
teenth Amendment speaks to the concepts of sovereignty and federalism, but endorse the 
Court's view stated here that the original scheme of the Constitution is what gives these concepts 
meaning. 
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within the doctrine,
97 
and its current view that due process serves as 
the sole basis of jurisdictional doctrine.98 Scholars too have wrestled 
with the question of whether state sovereign authority is relevant to 
personal jurisdiction,
99 
often concluding that the infusion of such con­
cerns into a law of personal jurisdiction based on the Due Process 
Clause is inappropriate.100 The Court and commentators have struggled 
with this question because the modern law of personal jurisdiction is 
rooted in the Due Process Clause, which protects individual rights and 
has nothing to do with state sovereignty or interstate federalism.101 
97 See id at 291-92 ("The concept of minimum contacts . . .  acts to ensure that the States, 
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as 
coequal sovereigns in a federal system."); Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 251 (1958) 
("[R]estrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts . . .  are more than a guarantee of 
immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limita­
tions on the power of the respective States."). 
98 See Insurance Corp of Ireland, Ltd v Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 US 694, 
703 n 10 (1982) ("(The Due Process] Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction re­
quirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns."); Shaffer v Heitner, 
433 US 186, 204 (1977) ("Thus, the relationship among the defendant, the forum , and the litiga­
tion , rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer 
rest, became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction."). Professor Borchers 
has made a similar observation. See Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Personal Jurisdiction in the 
United States and the European Community: Lessons for American Reform, 40 Am J Comp L 
121, 126 (1992) (suggesting that the Court has vacillated between dismissing and reviving a "sov­
ereignty " factor in personal jurisdiction cases). 
99 See , for example , Robert J. Condlin , "Defendant Veto" or "Totality of the Circum­
stances"? It's Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard 
Once Again, 5 4  Cath U L Rev 53, 147-48 (2004) ("[T]he problem of whether courts are entitled 
to take institutional and systemic interests, including sovereignty interests, into account in resolv­
ing jurisdictional disputes has never been adequately resolved . . . .  [T]he Court definitely will 
take such interests into account, but a serious question remains as to the legitimacy of doing 
so."); McFarland , 68 Mo L Rev at 790 (cited in note 12) ("[D]o state boundaries have continuing 
legal significance for the jurisdictional reach of state courts?"); Perdue, 62 Wash L Rev at 479 
(cited in note 45) ("The Court continues to treat geographic boundaries as central to the inter­
ests protected by personal jurisdiction, but has never satisfactorily explained why they are so 
central."). 
JOO See , for example , Abrams and Dimond, 69 Minn L Rev at 75 (cited in note 9) ("This 
Article contends that the due process clause is wholly inapposite to these interstate federalism 
concerns."); Daan Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 Syracuse L Rev 
533, 548 (1982) ("The language of the fourteenth amendment is directed toward the relationship 
between states and persons , and not the relationship between, or among, states. To extract from 
that clause the principle that a state's judicial authority should be limited by anything other than 
fairness to the defendant is difficult."). 
101 See Insurance Corp of Ireland, 456 US at 703 n I 0: 
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. , how­
ever , must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by 
the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction re­
quirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. 
See also Redish , 75 Nw U L Rev at 1114 (cited in note 56) ("[S]uch notions of federalism as 
limitations on the reach of personal jurisdiction are found nowhere in the body of the Constitu­
tion, much less in the terms of the due process clause."). 
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That is, if jurisdiction is all about due process, and due process has 
nothing to do with sovereignty or federalism, then sovereignty and 
federalism have no place within jurisdictional doctrine."
12 
But again we 
encounter a syllogism with a flawed foundation. Jurisdiction is not all 
about due process, with sovereignty and federalism only derivatively 
relevant thereto, if at all. Rather, jurisdiction is about due process and 
state sovereign authority, with sovereignty and interstate federalism 
being relevant on their own terms, owing nothing to due process in the 
matter. 
How is it that state sovereign authority (that is, state power as 
limited by the sovereignty of other states) is relevant per se to juris­
diction without help from the Due Process Clause? As previously dis­
cussed,103 although the Due Process Clause protects defendants against 
illegitimate, arbitrary assertions of jurisdiction, whether a state's asser­
tion of jurisdiction is legitimate and nonarbitrary is an issue of state 
sovereign authority."'' This is what the Court meant by its statement in 
International Shoe that the connection between the defendant and the 
state must be such as to make it "reasonable, in the context of our fed­
eral system of government, to require the corporation to defend the 
particular suit which is brought there."
105 Or, as Chief Justice Warren 
more clearly stated it, "[R]estrictions on the personal jurisdiction of 
state courts . . .  are a consequence of territorial limitations on the 
power of the respective States."
106 
The connection, then, between state 
sovereign authority and adjudicatory jurisdiction is that sovereign 
authority is the very basis of a state's jurisdictional power and its le­
gitimacy; individuals have a right to challenge jurisdictional assertions 
they believe to be arbitrary under the Due Process Clause.
107 
The fail­
ure to understand the nature of this link explains the Court's"., and 
102 See, for example, Redish, 75 Nw U L  Rev at 1114 (cited in note 56) ("Nothing in the 
concept of a federated system logically dictates any limitations on the reach of a state's authority 
to assert personal jurisdiction over private parties. "). 
toJ See Part 11.D. 
104 See Weinstein, 90 Va L Rev at 215 (cited in note 8) ("(L]imitations on state court juris­
diction were consistently understood to be a logical consequence of territorial limits on state 
authority."); Stein, 65 Tex L Rev at 711 (cited in note 93) ("Due process protects the sovereign 
interests of other states, but only incidentally, through its protection of the individual from ille­
gitimate assertions of state authority. Legitimacy, though, is defined by reference to the state's 
allocated authority within the federal system. "). 
ID5 International Shoe, 326 US at 317 (emphasis added). 
106 Hanson. 357 US at 251. 
ID7 Professors Robert Abrams and Paul Dimond offered a similar analysis of the connection 
between state sovereignty and due process in discussing Pennoyer's treatment of the issue when 
they wrote: "Territorial restraints relate to due process only to the extent that they are proxies 
for fairness." Abrams and Dimond, 69 Minn L Rev at 78-79 n 18 (cited in note 9). 
IOH Insurance Corp of Ireland, 456 US at 703 n 10: 
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commentators'
109 
befuddlement with the seeming ability of individuals 
either to assert or waive state sovereign interests when challenging or 
acquiescing to jurisdiction: defendants are not directly asserting or 
waiving sovereign rights of a state, but rather are raising ( or waiving) 
due process rights personal to them that protect them against arbi­
trary governmental encroachments. 
The real question then is how state sovereign authority shapes 
and constrains a state's legitimate assertion of jurisdiction over dis­
putes involving nonresident defendants. I pose the question in this 
fashion because thinking about jurisdiction over disputes (rather than 
over defendants) highlights the distinction between the issue of per­
sonal rights-which is the province of due process-and the issue of 
state power-which is a matter of state sovereignty and interstate fed­
eralism.110 State sovereignty and interstate federalism determine a 
state's authority to adjudicate a dispute, while due process protects an 
individual defendant involved in a dispute from assertions of jurisdic­
tion that violate protected rights. Turning attention to a court's author­
ity to hear a dispute rather than the court's authority over a particular 
defendant makes it more appropriate to speak of "adjudicatory" juris­
diction rather than "personal" jurisdiction because the latter term con­
notes concern with power over individuals while the former suggests 
power over disputes."' Focusing on a state's jurisdiction over a dispute 
[I]f the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power 
of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Indi­
vidual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject 
himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected. 
109 See, for example, McMunigal, 108 Yale L J at 212 (cited in note 32) ("[F]ederalism is 
inconsistent with the notion that an individual can waive the protections afforded by the mini­
mum contacts test. "); Abrams and Dimond, 69 Minn L Rev at 84 ( cited in note 9) ("[F]ederalism 
does not justify allowing an individual to assert the state's supposed interest as a personal due 
process right when the state could, if it wished, intervene in the suit or otherwise indicate that it 
perceives extraterritorial jurisdiction as an affront to its state sovereignty. "). 
1 10 The Court in Pennoyer focused on a state's authority to assert jurisdiction over defen­
dants, namely, those nonresidents who had not been served with process within the state. 95 US 
at 733 ("[I]f [proceedings] involve[ ] merely a determination of the personal liability of the de­
fendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his 
voluntary appearance. ") (emphasis added). The International Shoe Court framed the issue simi­
larly: how to "subject a defendant to a judgment in personam." 326 US at 316 (emphasis added). 
1 1 1  Using the term "adjudicatory jurisdiction " rather than "personal jurisdiction " in the 
manner suggested would appear to ignore the fact that the issues of subject matter jurisdiction 
and personal jurisdiction are both components of the larger concept of adjudicatory jurisdiction. 
My suggestion is that the concept of subject matter jurisdiction be regarded as a separate con­
cern from adjudicatory jurisdiction, serving to identify the topical limits of a court's competency. 
"Adjudicatory jurisdiction, "  then, would remain exclusively concerned with the matter of which 
disputes among those that fall within a court's topical (subject matter) jurisdiction also fall 
within its ambit of authority such that the decisions it renders will be considered valid and bind­
ing. That is the question that this conception of adjudicatory jurisdiction purports to address. 
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thus permits resolution of the pertinent issue at the heart of adjudica­
tory jurisdiction: whether a state's assertion of jurisdiction over a dis­
pute is a legitimate exercise of that state's sovereign authority. 
To resolve this question, we need look no further than the basic 
principles that the Court announced in Pennoyer as derivative of the 
concepts of state sovereignty and interstate federalism: states are 
powerless beyond their borders
112 
-a concept that derives from inter­
state federalism and to which I will refer as extraterritorial impotence­
but states are all-powerful within their borders,1 13 to the extent not 
limited by the federal constitution-a state sovereignty-based concept 
I will label domestic omnipotence. Pennoyer interpreted these con­
cepts as limiting the reach of states to those persons served with proc­
ess within their boundaries ( and those who were state citizens or who 
consented to jurisdiction),"' while the Court sixty-seven years later in 
International Shoe believed that defendants who had simply estab­
lished certain minimum contacts within a state's borders manifested 
sufficient in-state "presence" to be subject to the domestic sovereignty 
and thus jurisdiction of that state."' 
Although no longer demanding Pennoyer's rigid requirement of 
in-state service, state citizenship, or consent, the principles of domestic 
omnipotence and extraterritorial impotence remain relevant as the 
basis from which we may deduce the proper scope of a state's jurisdic­
tional authority. A state's domestic omnipotence gives it authority, as 
an extension of its police power,11
0 
to exercise jurisdiction over dis­
putes involving nonconsenting, nonresident defendants where the ac­
tion implicates the legitimate governmental interests of the state 
within its borders. Correspondingly, by virtue of its extraterritorial 
impotence, a state may not coercively assert jurisdiction over disputes 
J l2 Pennoyer, 95 US at 722 ("[N)o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over 
persons or property without its territory . . . .  The several States are of equal dignity and authority, 
and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. "). 
113 Id ("[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and 
property within its territory. "). 
1 14  Id at 732-34. 
1 1 s  326 US at 316-18. 
116 See United States v Morrison, 529 US 598, 618 n 8 (2000) ("[T)he Constitution reserves 
the general police power to the States."). See also Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77, 83 (1949) ("The 
police power of a state extends beyond health , morals and safety, and comprehends the duty, 
within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community. "). The 
Supreme Court has explained the purpose of the police power as follows: 
The police power of a State . . .  springs from the obligation of the State to protect its citizens 
and provide for the safety and good order of society . . . .  It is the governmental power of self 
protection and permits reasonable regulation of rights and property in particulars essential 
to the preservation of the community from injury. 
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co v State Highway Commission, 294 US 613, 622 (1935). 
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that are wholly foreign in nature, meaning those disputes that have no 
connection with the state or in which the state has no interest. Just as a 
state's legislative or regulatory jurisdiction extends only to those mat­
ters in which the state has an interest,117 so too is a state's adjudicatory 
jurisdiction limited to those disputes in which it has an interest. State 
interest analysis, then, must become the core inquiry for determining 
whether state sovereignty and interstate federalism permit the exer­
cise of jurisdiction over disputes involving nonresident defendants.1 1" 
The Court has already indicated that the interest of the forum 
state in resolving the dispute is a consideration in jurisdictional analy­
sis under the reasonableness prong of the International Shoe test.1 1• 
But prior to the advent of the modem bifurcated version of the Inter­
national Shoe test
120 
in which state interest is subordinated to consid­
erations of burden on the defendant, the Court treated the interest of 
the forum state as central to the determination of whether courts have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute. In Travelers Health Association v 
Virginia
121 the Court, acknowledging that "a state has a legitimate in­
terest in all insurance policies protecting its residents against risks, an 
interest which the state can protect even though the 'state action may 
have repercussions beyond state lines,"'
122 
upheld jurisdiction based on 
the connection between the defendant insurer and forum resident in­
sureds, and the state's interest in protecting those residents.123 Similarly, 
in McGee the Court upheld jurisdiction based on the connection be­
tween the defendant insurer and a resident insured, and on the forum 
state's "manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its 
residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims."
12
• It is worth noting 
here that not only did the Court reject the purported inconvenience to 
1 1 7  Allstate Insurance Co v Hague, 449 US 302, 308 ("(T]he Court has invalidated the choice 
of law of a State which has had no significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, 
creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction."). 
1 18 The term "state interest analysis" used here should be distinguished from the term "in­
terest analysis" used by Professor Roy Brooks to describe his understanding of current doctrine, 
which in his view looks primarily at the parties' interests in having the case tried in a particular 
forum. See Roy L. Brooks, The Essential Purpose and Analytical Structure of Personal Jurisdic­
tion Law, 27 Ind L Rev 361, 365 (1993). 
1 1 9  See Asahi, 480 US at 113 (recognizing "the interests of the forum State " as one of the 
five "reasonableness" factors). 
120 See Burger King, 471 US at 476 ("Once it has been decided that a defendant purpose­
fully established minimum contacts within the forum State, these contacts may be considered in 
light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport 
with 'fair play and substantial justice."'). 
121  339 us 643 (1950). 
122 Id at 647, quoting Osborn v Oz/in, 310 US 53, 62 (1940). 
123 339 US at 648. 
124 355 US at 223. See also Condlin, 54 Cath U L Rev at 62 (cited in note 99) ("Ultimately, 
McGee is probably best explained as a 'sovereignty' or 'state interest' case."). 
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the defendant in McGee as insufficient to count as a denial of due 
process,"' but the Court also suggested that the absence of any conten­
tion that the state failed to supply adequate notice or the opportunity 
to be heard meant that no further impediment to the state's jurisdic­
tion remained.
120 
More recently in Mullane, the Court provided one of the most 
striking examples of the role that state interest has in empowering a 
state with adjudicatory jurisdiction. In upholding the jurisdiction of a 
state court to enter a judgment that would bind nonresident trust 
beneficiaries, the Court wrote: 
[T]he interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that 
exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the su­
pervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to 
establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the in­
terests of all claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its pro­
cedure accords full opportunity to appear and be heard. 121 
Note the centrality of state interest analysis, the check on state 
authority provided by the rights to notice and hearing, and the com­
plete absence of any concern with litigant convenience. The Court 
made these points even more clearly when it wrote: 
[T]he vital interest of the State in bringing any issues as to its fi­
duciaries to a final settlement can be served only if interests or 
claims of individuals who are outside of the State can somehow 
b� determined . . . .  
Against this interest of the State we must balance the individual 
interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This is defined by our holding that "[t]he fundamental requisite 
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard." . . .  This 
right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed 
that the matter is pending.
128 
Again, state interests are balanced against procedural due proc­
ess rights, which are defined as the right to notice and the opportunity 
to be heard, and not as the right not to be subjected to inconvenient 
litigation. Thus Mullane presents a clear instance of the Court using 
125 355 US at 224. 
126 Id (concluding its jurisdictional analysis by noting, "[t]here is no contention that respon­
dent did not have adequate notice of the suit or sufficient time to prepare its defenses and ap­
pear" and ··respondent was given a reasonable time to appear and defend on the merits after 
being notified of the suit"). 
127 Mullane, 339 US at 313. 
128 Id at 313-14. 
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state interest analysis to conclude that the state has authority to exer­
cise adjudicatory jurisdiction, limited only by the issue of whether 
proper notice and the opportunity to be heard have been given. 
State interests played a critical role in conferring jurisdiction on 
the forum state in Calder v Jones
129 
as well. Faced with Florida defen­
dants who were alleged to have intentionally defamed a California 
resident, the Calder Court stated, "Jurisdiction over [the defendants] is 
therefore proper in California based on the 'effects' of their Florida 
conduct in California."
130 
In support of this conclusion, the Court cited 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 37, which explains, "A 
state has a natural interest in the effects of an act within its territory 
even though the act itself was done elsewhere."
131 
In Calder, California 
had a clear interest in opening its courts to a state resident who alleg­
edly had been intentionally injured by outsiders.
132 
With notice not 
challenged and the state's interest clear and strong, the state's adjudi­
catory jurisdiction was proper, without any reference to the potential 
inconvenience of litigation for the defendants.
133 
Keeton v Hustler Magazine, Inc'34 provides yet another example of 
the centrality that state interest analysis should play in jurisdictional 
determinations. After stating that the relevant inquiry was the "the 
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation," 
then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, indicated that 
the relationship must be such that jurisdiction would be "fair," and 
that "the 'fairness' of haling respondent into a New Hampshire court 
depends to some extent on whether respondent's activities relating to 
New Hampshire are such as to give that State a legitimate interest in 
holding respondent answerable on a claim related to those activities."
135 
Justice Rehnquist then proceeded to engage in a thorough analysis of 
New Hampshire's interests, finding that "New Hampshire has clearly 
expressed its interest in protecting such persons [nonresidents] from 
libel, as well as in safeguarding its populace from falsehoods" and that 
"New Hampshire also has a substantial interest in cooperating with 
129 465 us 783 (1984). 
130 Id at 789, citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at 297-98 and Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws § 37. 
131 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 37, comment a. See also id § 36, comment c 
("A state has an especial interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts 
within its territory."). 
132 See 465 US at 790 ("An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek 
redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida , knowingly cause the injury in Califor­
nia."). 
133 See id ("[P]etitioners are primary participants in an alleged wrongdoing intentionally 
directed at a California resident, and jurisdiction over them is proper on that basis."). 
134 465 us 770 (1984). 
135 Id at 775-76. 
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other States, through the 'single publication rule,' to provide a forum 
for efficiently litigating all issues and damage claims arising out of a 
libel in a unitary proceeding."
136 
On the strength of these state interests 
and without regard to convenience to the defendant, the Court held 
that jurisdiction was proper in New Hampshire.131 
As Calder and Keeton demonstrate most clearly, and the other 
cases mentioned earlier confirm, the concept of minimum contacts 
was originally intended to protect the notion that valid adjudicatory 
jurisdiction is limited to those cases in which the defendant's contacts 
have implicated legitimate interests of the state. That is, the minimum 
connection that must exist between a nonresident defendant and the 
forum is one where the alleged actions of the defendant have impli­
cated the legitimate interests of the forum state, creating a link that 
makes it fair and nonarbitrary for that state to exercise adjudicatory 
authority over the case against that defendant. Where a nonresident 
defendant acts in such a way so as to adversely affect affairs within a 
state, disputes arising therefrom are something that a state has a clear 
interest in resolving;
138 
such an interest justifies jurisdiction unless there 
is a real injury to any of the constitutionally protected due process in­
terests identified above."' 
It is through this analysis that we can reconceive the idea of 
minimum contacts into an idea focused on the implication of state 
interests. That is, rather than analyzing whether a defendant has estab­
lished minimum contacts with a state, the question becomes whether 
the defendant acted in a way that implicates a state's interests such 
that it may adjudicate any resultant dispute. Purposefulness recedes 
from the scene under this formulation, as the intentionality of the de­
fendant in so implicating a state's interest is not relevant to a state 
interest analysis. That is because sovereign power, where it properly 
exists to protect legitimate state interests, operates by command, not 
136 Id at 777. 
137 Id at 781 ("There is no unfairness in calling [defendant] to answer for the contents of 
that publication wherever a substantial number of copies are regularly sold and distributed. "). 
138 See Burger King , 471 US at 473 ("A State generally has a 'manifest interest' in providing 
its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors."), 
quoting McGee, 355 US at 223; Keeton, 465 US at 776 ("And it is beyond dispute that New 
Hampshire has a significant interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the State. "). 
139 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at 312 (Brennan dissenting) ( emphasis added): 
If a plaintiff can show that his chosen forum State has a sufficient interest in the litigation 
(or sufficient contacts with the defendant), then the defendant who cannot show some real 
injury to a constitutionally protected interest . .. should have no constitutional excuse not to 
appear. 
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permission.
1
'° It is thus the mere implication of the state's interest, not 
the defendant's intent or lack of intent to implicate that interest, 
which places a dispute within the authority of a state to resolve. 
What of the "critical" right to "reasonably anticipate being haled 




If jurisdictional analysis abandons any re­
quirement that defendants purposefully make a connection with a 
state, it can be argued that they will lack notice of where their actions 
will and will not subject them to suit, and, as a result, the matter of 
jurisdiction will become hopelessly unpredictable. Such an argument 
has long been considered a red herring whose circularity has been 
recognized by all but the Court itself. 1'2 The argument has been re­
jected as circular because defendants will anticipate being "haled into 
court" wherever the law says they are subject to suit; thus, defining the 
law of jurisdiction with reference to the expectations of defendants 
makes no sense. To illustrate the point, if the law in the federal courts 
tomorrow were changed to give those courts nationwide personal ju­
risdiction -which is well within Congress's authority to confer
1
" -
defendants would thenceforth be on notice that their conduct within 
the United States will submit them to personal jurisdiction in any of 
its federal district courts.
1
" So too would defendants be able to antici­
pate the fora in which they could be haled into court if the law of ju­
risdiction were altered to subject defendants to jurisdiction in those 
states where their conduct implicates legitimate state interests. In any 
event, the law of personal jurisdiction in its current form hardly pro­
vides the level of predictability that would give defendants the ability 
to anticipate where they will be subject to jurisdiction. A doctrine 
rooted primarily in state interest analysis is far more likely to yield 
less confusion regarding one's amenability to jurisdiction. 
140 See Arthur M. Weisburd, Territorial Authority and Personal Jurisdiction, 63 Wash U L Q 
377,402 (1985) ("The state does not simply invite defendants to participate in a civil suit; it or­
ders them to do so."). 
141 See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at 297. 
142 Justice Brennan made this point in his dissent to World-Wide Volkswagen. See id at 311 
n 18 (Brennan dissenting) ("A defendant cannot know if his actions will subject him to jurisdic­
tion in another State until we have declared what the law of jurisdiction is. "). Professor Borchers 
stated the point best when he wrote , "[T]he 'jurisdictional surprise' argument is circular. Any 
expectation that a defendant has of avoiding an out-of-state court is a function of the jurisdic­
tional rules themselves. Thus the 'jurisdictional surprise' argument cannot justify the contents of 
jurisdictional rules , it simply describes a consequence of having such rules. " Borchers, 24 UC 
Davis L Rev at 94 (cited in note 13). 
143 See , for example, Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller , 4B Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1125 (West 3d ed 2002) (recognizing the "continuing force " of congressional statutes 
to provide for extraterritorial or national service). 
144 Of course, the federal venue statutes would limit the districts that could properly hear 
the case-a subconstitutional , nonjurisdictional way of siting an action and addressing concerns 
regarding convenience. 
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IV. ADJUDICATORY JURISDICTION RIGHTLY CONCEIVED: 
STATE INTEREST ANALYSIS 
A. A Restatement of the Law of Adjudicatory Jurisdiction 
1. The proposal . 
647 
Having excised concerns about litigation inconvenience from due 
process, the underbrush has been sufficiently cleared to perceive the 
true contributions of due process to a jurisdictional inquiry and to 
restore the forsaken concepts of state sovereignty and interstate fed­
eralism to their rightful place of centrality within the doctrine. Based 
on the proper understandings of due process and state sovereign au­
thority discussed above, the law of adjudicatory jurisdiction can be 
restated as follows: a state court may exercise jurisdiction over a dis­
pute involving a nonconsenting, nonresident defendant not served 
with process within the state's borders provided: (1) the defendant has 
received proper notice of the suit such as will afford an opportunity to 
present its defense, and (2) the state has a legitimate governmental 
interest in the dispute. Where assertions of jurisdiction are thought to 
be inconvenient or unduly burdensome, those concerns may be ad­
dressed through the doctrines of venue or forum non conveniens. 
There would no longer be a bifurcated analysis of contacts and rea­
sonableness; the proposed revision entails a unified inquiry into the 
presence of a legitimate state interest, which in and of itself justifies 
jurisdiction and renders jurisdiction "reasonable," in the sense com­
prehended by the Due Process Clause in that it is nonarbitrary. 
Note that this proposal applies only to cases where the defendant 
has not consented to jurisdiction. The proposal is so limited because in 
consent situations the defendant has voluntarily submitted to the au­
thority of the state's courts and has thus waived any jurisdictional due 
process rights he or she might have asserted."' The jurisdictional 
analysis proposed is only necessary where the state attempts a coer­
cive exercise of jurisdiction, which is one involving a defendant who 
has not voluntarily submitted to the state's authority. 
It should also be noted that the revised analysis concerns itself 
only with cases where the defendant is not served with process within 
the forum state. That states have jurisdiction over those served with 
process within their borders is a longstanding principle of American 
145 Voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of a court can occur in any number of ways, 
including via contractual consent, as a result of a statutory obligation to consent in exchange for 
the right to obtain a license to do business within a state, or through a voluntary appearance. 
Also included in this group would be nonresident plaintiffs, who have consented to a court's 
jurisdiction by selecting it as the forum for their suit. 
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law. As Justice Scalia stated the point in Burnham v Superior Court,1
46 
"Among the most f irmly established principles of personal jurisdiction 
in American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction 
over nonresidents who are physically present in the State.""' Limiting 
the proposed analysis to cases where there is no in-state service is a 
result of the domestic omnipotence principle, which renders any per­
son or property located within a state's borders subject to an exercise 
of authority by the state if found and served or seized therein. Further, 
due process restricts only arbitrary assertions of state court jurisdic­
tion. There is nothing arbitrary about a state's assertion of jurisdiction 
over a person found within its borders because such jurisdiction is the 
foundation of state jurisdictional authority by which all other asser­
tions of jurisdiction have come to be measured."" Certainly, "tag" ju­
risdiction-as jurisdiction based on in-state service has come to be 
known-could be viewed a priori as random or arbitrary, were it pre­
sented for the first time today as a basis of jurisdiction."
9 However, 
because in-state service was an acceptable basis for jurisdiction during 
the period in which the constitutional protections of due process were 
crafted,
150 
it is not possible-absent an evolutionary view of constitu­
tional understandings-to hold that the conception of due process 
espoused by the progenitors of these protections did not embrace the 
allowance of in-state service as a legitimate means of founding adjudi­
catory jurisdiction. 
146 495 us 604 (1990). 
147 Id at 610. 
148 The Burnham Court stated: 
[J]urisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of 
the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of "tradi­
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice." That standard was developed by analogy 
to "physical presence," and it would be perverse to say it could now be turned against that 
touchstone of jurisdiction. 
Id at 619. 
149 See, for example, Paul D. Carrington and James A. Martin, Substantive Interests and the 
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 Mich L Rev 227, 227 (1967) ("Committed as we are to the idea 
that judicial power should be exercised in a manner that is responsive to the common welfare, 
we could not suffer the limits of power to be determined irrationally by the random success of 
process servers."); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The 
"Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale L J 289, 290 (1956) ("The rule [of transient juris­
diction] may result in trying the suit in a State in which no part of the operative facts occurred 
and in which neither of the parties lives.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
150 See Burnham, 495 US at 610-11 ("The view developed early that each State had the 
power to hale before its courts any individual . . .  within its borders, . . .  by properly serving him 
with process, .. . no matter how fleeting his visit. "), citing Potter v Allin, 2 Root 63, 67 (Conn 
1793), and Barrell v Benjamin, 15 Mass 354 (1819). But see Ehrenzweig, 65 Yale L J at 293-96 
(cited in note 149) (questioning the existence of solid early common law authority in support of 
a longstanding rule of transient jurisdiction). 
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Contrary to the concerns motivating other commentators' pro­
posals for reform, it is not out of any sense that jurisdictional doctrine 
is no longer capable of resolving jurisdictional questions in modem 
times that I offer this revised analysis. 151 As I have argued elsewhere, 
the doctrine in its current state is perfectly capable of being applied to 
disputes arising out of contacts mediated through the Internet."' So, it 
is not that the doctrine has aged poorly and is in need of a modem 
successor; rather, the problem is that the law of personal jurisdiction­
as concerned primarily with defendant intentions, expectations, and 
experiences of inconvenience -is fundamentally flawed. The confu­
sion and unpredictability it has sown is not a product of societal or 
technological progress but rather flows from its misperceived founda­
tions and the resultant doctrinal incoherence.153 
2. State interest defined. 
How would state interest analysis work? Under the proposed 
analysis, states would be solely responsible for articulating the circum­
stances under which their interests would be sufficiently implicated to 
support an assertion of jurisdiction. This would be done through the 
states' long-arm statutes, many of which currently set forth in detail 
the situations warranting state court jurisdiction.'54 Common among 
long-arm statutes are assertions of jurisdiction where liability arises 
from any of the following situations: 
a) Domicile or residency. The defendant is a natural person 
domiciled within the state, a domestic business entity, or a person or 
entity engaged in substantial activities within the state. 
b) Transacting business. The cause of action arises out of the 
defendant's transaction of business in the state. 
c) Contracts. The cause of action arises out of the defendant's 
contracting to supply goods or services within the state. 
151 See , for example, Condlin, 54 Cath U L Rev at 130---31 (cited in note 99) ("Internet­
based forum contacts (through websites, chat rooms, newsgroups, and the like) do[] not fit easily 
into the doctrinal categories inherited from the International Shoe-Burger King line of decisions, 
and provide[ ] the Court with both a reason and an opportunity to reconstitute the 'minimum 
contacts' standard."). 
152 See generally A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Tradi­
tional Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U Ill L Rev 71. 
153 See Borchers. 40 Am J Comp L at 122 (cited in note 98) ("The Supreme Court has 
evinced great uncertainty as to, and a great preoccupation with, the theoretical underpinnings of 
its doctrine, while steering an erratic course that confuses courts, counsel, academicians. and 
often the Justices as well."). 
154 Many states do not bother enumerating the circumstances under which their courts may 
exercise jurisdiction; rather, they simply indicate that jurisdiction may be exercised to the limit 
permitted by the U.S. Constitution. See, for example, Ala St R Civ P 4.2(b) (2004); Cal Civ Proc 
Code § 410.10 (2004); RI Gen Laws § 9-5-33 (2004); Wyo Stat § 5-1-107 (2005). 
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d) Torts. The cause of action arises out of the defendant's 
causing of tortious injury within the state by an act or omission within 
the state; or the cause of action arises out of the defendant's causing of 
tortious injury within the state by an act or omission within the state 
where the defendant regularly does business or solicits business within 
the state. 
e) Property ownership. The cause of action arises out of the 
defendant's having an interest in, using or possessing real property 
within the state. 
f) Marriage and parentage. The cause of action arises out of 
the defendant's enjoyment of a marital or parent-child relationship 
within the state, provided a party to the relationship still resides within 
the state.
155 
The circumstances described above can fairly be said to reflect 
situations in which a state would have a sufficient interest in a dispute 
to authorize it to exercise jurisdiction. However, it is not my purpose 
here to enumerate a definitive list of such circumstances. The point is 
that states, through their long-arm statutes, have demonstrated the 
capacity to articulate their interests in a manner that comports with 
the limitations on their sovereign authority and could continue to do 
so under the revised analysis herein proposed. 
It is possible that states may imagine other situations in which 
their interests would be implicated. For example, a state might feel it 
has an interest in the subject matter of a dispute when one of its resi­
dents is the plaintifr.1
56 
Or, it is possible that a state may feel that it has 
an interest whenever a defendant is alleged to have caused tortious 
injury within the state from without, regardless of whether the defen­
dant regularly does business within the state. The measuring rod for 
determining whether such claims of state interest would be legitimate 
would be the limits of the state's police power, given that the basis for 
a state's authority to adjudicate is derivative of the police power that 
it enjoys domestically. That is, when faced with a given assertion of a 
state's interest, one should ask whether the interest the state is seeking 
to protect is properly viewed as falling within that state's domestic 
155 For statutes that list all of these factors in some form, see, for example, Colo Rev Stat 
Ann § 13-1-124 (West 2005); DC Code § 13-423 (2003); Fla Stat Ann § 48.193 (West 2003); 42 Pa 
Cons Stat Ann § 5322 (2004); Wis Stat § 801.05 (2005). 
156 This is the jurisdictional rule in force within France: 
A foreigner, even if not residing in France, may be cited before French courts for the execu­
tion of obligations contracted by him in France with a Frenchman; he may be brought be­
fore the courts of France for obligations by him contracted in foreign countries towards 
Frenchmen. 
Code Civile art 14 (1977). 
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police power. A state's police power allows it to provide protection 
and regulation in the areas of community health, morals, safety, secu­
rity, and public welfare, and also allows a state to provide for general 
tranquility and order within the community it controls. 15' 
Applying this standard to the example of a state asserting an in­
terest in any case where one of its residents is a plaintiff, that fact 
alone would be insufficient to fall within the police power of a state. If 
a citizen of Virginia travels to California and is assaulted by a Califor­
nian there, Virginia has no legitimate interest in resolving the dispute 
because the alleged assault did not violate the sphere of domestic pro­
tection that Virginia has a right to provide within its borders.'
5
8 A 
state's police power exists only within its borders; just as Virginia has 
no ability to create tort law that persons in California must respect,'
59 
it 
has no authority to force Californians who violate California tort law 
in California to submit to the jurisdiction of Virginia simply because 
they have assaulted a Virginian. Virginia cannot protect Virginians 
beyond its borders;'(,() travelers leaving the state must rely on the pro­
tection of the states they visit, or that of the federal government. Thus, 
those not alleged to have acted, in some way, to violate the tranquility 
and order provided by a state domestically cannot be said to fall 
within that state's sphere of authority. On the other hand, where 
157 See Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77, 83 (1949) ("The police power . .. comprehends the 
duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a commu­
nity."); Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co v State Highway Commission, 294 US 613, 622 (1935) 
("The police power of a State . . .  is the governmental power of self protection, and permits rea­
sonable regulation of rights and property in particulars essential to the preservation of the com­
munity from injury.") (internal citation omitted). 
158 See, for example, Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US 809,824 (1975) ("A State does not acquire 
power or supervision over the internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and 
health of its own citizens may be affected when they travel to that State."). 
159 See Huntington v Attrill, 146 US 657, 669 (1892) ("Laws have no force of themselves 
beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them."). 
160 Interest analysis in the context of choice-of-law determinations has not proven to be as 
limited. There are cases holding that a state does have a sufficient interest in a dispute to justify 
applying its law on the basis of the plaintiffs status as a citizen of that state. See, for example, 
Phillips v General Motors, 995 P2d 1002, 1014-15 (Mont 2000) (applying Montana law on the 
basis of interest analysis principles embodied in § 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws to a negligence and strict liability claim brought by Montana citizens against a Michigan 
defendant based on an accident occurring in Kansas). The difference is warranted because states' 
interest in having actions tried in their courts is different than their interest in having their laws 
apply. States enact laws to further particular substantive policies, which in turn are furthered 
when those laws are applied to disputes where those policy interests are implicated. However, a 
state's interest in providing a forum for adjudicating a dispute is not as closely connected with 
the furtherance of substantive state policies because that is ultimately achieved more directly via 
the application of its laws (which will not necessarily correspond to the state's exercise of juris­
diction). Given the relatively weaker interest a state has in adjudicating a case versus supplying 
the applicable law, a state's interest in adjudicating a case solely based upon the plaintiffs status 
as a citizen of that state is correspondingly diminished. 
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wrongdoing is visited by nonresidents from without, directly against 
state citizens reposed within the state, the domestic tranquility and 
order established by that state has been breached and it may rightly 
call the alleged wrongdoers to account in its courts. In sum, although 
Virginia in our example may feel it has an interest in this dispute be­
cause the victim is a Virginian, its interest is not legitimate because the 
California encounter falls outside its domestic sphere of authority. 
3. The role of venue and forum non conveniens. 
Although inconvenience is banished from jurisdictional doctrine 
and demoted to a subconstitutional, nonjurisdictional concern under 
my revised analysis, it is not banished from the analysis altogether. 
Rather, as earlier discussed, after proper jurisdiction is established in a 
forum based on notice, hearing, and the presence of a legitimate state 
interest, the defendant may then challenge the propriety of the forum 
under the venue rules of that system. The federal venue statute pro­
vides that venue is proper in the district where any defendant resides 
if all parties reside in the same state, where a substantial portion of the 
act or omission giving rise to the action occurred, or provided neither 
of those tests supply a proper venue, where any defendant may be 
found or subjected to personal jurisdiction.
161 
The venue provisions of 
most states similarly provide for venue where one of the defendants 
resides or where the claim arose. 1
62 
Of course, on the state level, a de­
fendant who finds it inconvenient to defend in a particular state at all 
will find little solace in being able to select a particular venue within 
that state. Nevertheless, if venue is proper under the relevant venue 
statute applicable in the forum court, then the defendant's conven­
ience concerns have been fully addressed, provided there are no good 
arguments for a transfer of venue or a forum non conveniens dis­
missal. 
161  28 USC § 1391 (2000) . 
162 See, for example, Ala Code § 6-3-2 to -11 (1993 & Supp 2004); Cal Civ Proc Code §§ 392-
395.5 (West 2004 & Supp 2005); Fla Stat Ann § 47.011-47.081 (West 1994 & Supp 2005); 735 
ILCS Ann 5/2-101 to -103 (West 1992 & Supp 1992); La Code Civ Proc Ann art 42-86 (West 1999 
& Supp 2005); Mich Comp Laws Ann § 600.1605--{i00.1641 (West 1996 & Supp 2005); Neb Rev 
Stat § 25-401 to -417 (Reissue 1995); NY Civ Prac L and Rules §§ 503-09 (McKinney 1976 & 
Supp 2005); RI Gen Laws § 9-4-2 to -5 (1997); Tex Civ Prac and Remedies Code Ann § 15 .002 
(West 2002); Va Code Ann § 8.01-261 to -262 (Michie 2000 & Supp 2005); Wash Rev Code 
Ann § 4.12 .010-4.12 .025 (West 2005). Attribution is due to Professor Mary Garvey Algero who 
compiled these state venue provisions in her article, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic 
Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 Neb L Rev 79, 83 n 12 (1999). A nice review of state venue provi­
sions also may be found in Gregory 8. Westfall, The Nature of this Debate: A Look at the Texas 
Foreign Corporation Venue Rule and a Method for Analyzing the Premises and Promises of Ton 
Reform, 26 Tex Tech L Rev 903, 913-21 (1995) (dividing state venue provisions into "broad," 
"restrictive," and "open for court interpretation" categories). 
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In the federal system, venue transfers are appropriate where "the 
convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice" 
suggests that an alternative venue would be a better place to hear the 
case, and that venue is another district within the federal system.16.
1 
Forum non conveniens dismissals are appropriate where the more 
appropriate venue lies beyond the forum's judicial system. The Su­
preme Court identified the key considerations for determining whether 
such dismissals are appropriate in Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert:
164 
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to 
sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for atten­
dance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of will­
ing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be 
appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that 
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may 
also be questions as to the [enforceability] of a judgment if one is 
obtained. The court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles 
to fair trial . It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of 
an inconvenient forum, "vex," "harass," or "oppress" the defen­
dant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to 
his own right to pursue his remedy. But unless the balance is 
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum 
should rarely be disturbed. 
Factors of public interest also have [a] place in applying the doc­
trine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation 
is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its 
origin . Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon 
the people of a community which has no relation to the iitigation. 
In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason 
for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote 
parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only.'
05 
If a defendant finds himself in a dramatically inconvenient forum 
that asserts an interest in the dispute, the defendant may, if the facts 
warrant, argue that a court of another state would be more appropri­
ate because, for example, all of the witnesses and evidence are located 
there. A good example of this approach is found in the recent case of 
163 28 USC § 1404(a) (2000). A venue transfer is also appropriate if the case is brought in an 
improper venue and the court deems it to be "in the interest of justice" to transfer the case to 
another district "in which it could have been brought" rather than dismiss it. 28 USC § 1406(a) 
(2000). 
164 330 US 501 (1947) (upholding a forum non conveniens dismissal). 
165 Id at 508---09. 
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Zeta-Jones v Spice House,1
66 
where the defendant sought and was granted 
a venue transfer from California federal court to federal court in his 
home state of Nevada because of his medical condition and the asso­
ciated inconvenience of traveling to California, and because most of the 
evidence and witnesses were found to be located in Nevada. 1
61 
Thus, if 
litigating in the plaintiff's selected forum is truly burdensome for a 
defendant, to a degree that the defendant is severely burdened in pre­
senting his defense, then the ability to transfer a case to another venue, 
where appropriate, should yield relief. As should the proper applica­
tion of the principles of forum non conveniens, as articulated by the 
Court in Gulf Oil.",P, 
4. In rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
As suggested above, a state has a clear interest in resolving dis­
putes involving real property located within its borders, regardless of 
the residency status of the property owner. In rem jurisdiction, as cur­
rently understood, would thus not be upset . Quasi in rem jurisdiction, 
however, would suffer the fate already given it in Shaffer v Heitner.1
69 
That is, the Shaffer Court indicated that assertions of quasi in rem ju­
risdiction would have to be evaluated with reference to the same prin­
ciples of International Shoe that were used to evaluate other assertions 
of personal jurisdiction."
0 Under the proposed state interest analysis, the 
same would be true: jurisdiction over a dispute involving a nonresident 
defendant based on unrelated in-state property would have to be 
evaluated with reference to whether the interests of the forum state 
were implicated. Generally speaking, the actions of a nonresident un­
related to in-state property and having no domestic impact are 
unlikely to implicate the interests of the state where the property is 
located. Only where the dispute somehow concerns the property­
either directly or indirectly-will the state be able to assert an interest 
166 372 F Supp 2d 568 (CD Cal 2005). 
167 Id at 576 (noting also the ease with which the plaintiff could travel to Nevada). 
168 Professors Abrams and Dimond suggest that "Congress could require states to grant 
motions for forum non conveniens dismissals when certain convenience standards are not satis­
fied or are better satisfied by other available forums." Abrams and Dimond, 69 Minn L Rev at 
102 (cited in note 9). Although not opposed to congressionally imposed standards, the revised 
analysis proposed in this Article does not require congressional intervention in this area but 
rather leaves defendants to the various versions of the forum non conveniens doctrine found 
within the several states. 
169 433 US 186, 209 (1978) ("Thus, although the presence of the defendant's property in a 
State might suggest the existence of other ties . . .  the presence of property alone would not 
support the State's jurisdiction."). 
170 Shaffer, 433 US at 212 ("[A]ll assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated 
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."). 
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in the dispute on the basis of the property. Where the property is not 
relevant to the dispute but serves as the only basis for jurisdiction, 
quasi in rem jurisdiction in that sense will not be recognized given the 
patent lack of state interest in the matter. 
5. General and specific jurisdiction. 
State interest analysis does not upset the distinction between 
general and specific jurisdiction first highlighted by Professors von 
Mehren and Trautman and subsequently embraced by the Court. 
However, under the proposed analysis, general jurisdiction is limited 
to cases involving defendants that reside within the state. Such a limi­
tation is appropriate because a state can only exercise complete sov­
ereignty over those properly classed as members of that state's politi­
cal community;
171 
nonresidents, as nonmembers of the community, are 
only fairly reachable through their actions that touch and concern the 
state so as to implicate legitimate state interests. Even if a nonresident 
is extremely active within a state, that state has no interest in a dispute 
involving that nonresident based on activity occurring beyond the 
state's boundaries unless it is alleged that those external acts had 
harmful consequences domestically. When there are only external ac­
tions and external consequences, no state can legitimately exercise 
sovereignty over absentee, nonconsenting, nonresident defendants no 
matter how active they may be within the state. 
A fair question, then, is under what circumstances may a defen­
dant be classed as a resident of the state, such that general jurisdiction 
will be available? This is a question to be posed of corporate defen­
dants, for the matter of the state residency of individuals has been 
conclusively resolved as their state of domicile, which provides the 
only basis for exercising general jurisdiction over real persons beyond 
in-state service.
112 
Corporate defendants can fairly be said to be resi­
dents-at a minimum-of those states under whose laws they are or­
ganized and those states where they have their corporate headquar­
ters. Beyond that, it may be possible for a state to define residency 
with reference to the existence of extensive physical operations within 
the state. But that is a standard that cannot be clearly defined; how 
extensive would a company's physical operations have to be before a 
state could legitimately consider that entity to be resident within the 
171 See Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 Duke L J 1, 10 (1991) 
("General jurisdiction is primarily based upon membership in the local community."). 
172 See Burnham, 495 US at 610 n 1 ("It may be that whatever special rule exists permitting 
'continuous and systematic' contacts ... to support jurisdiction with respect to matters unrelated 
to activity in the forum applies only to corporations.") (internal citation omitted). 
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state? Certainly, where all of the entity's operations or employees are 
within the state-even though its headquarters and state of incorpora­
tion may be elsewhere-that entity is truly resident within the state 
because the state would be the entity's principal place of business. As 
one travels down the scale to lesser degrees of operation, however, the 
case for residency becomes more difficult to make. I submit that facts 
that depart from the archetypical case just described would not war­
rant a declaration of state residency because the presence of opera­
tions that fall short of full-scale corporate activities no longer reflects 
the level of community membership that justifies the state's jurisdiction 
over any and all disputes involving that defendant. In other words, once 
operations and corporate activities are sited elsewhere in addition to 
the state in question, that state no longer has a legitimate interest in 
disputes arising out of those external activities that have no domestic 
impact. 
This position is consistent with Supreme Court precedent regard­
ing general jurisdiction, which reveals only a single case where general 
jurisdiction has been deemed appropriate: Perkins v Benguet Consoli­
dated Mining Co."' As the Court later explained regarding Perkins: 
[T ]he president and general manager of a Philippine mining cor­
poration [Benguet] maintained an office in Ohio from which he 
conducted activities on behalf of the company. He kept company 
files and held directors' meetings in the office, carried on corre­
spondence relating to the business, distributed salary checks drawn 
on two active Ohio bank accounts, engaged an Ohio bank to act 
as transfer agent, and supervised policies dealing with the reha­
bilitation of the corporation's properties in the Philippines. In 
short, the foreign corporation, through its president, "ha[ d] been 
carrying on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited, part 
of its general business," and the exercise of general jurisdiction 
over the Philippine corporation by an Ohio court was "reason­
able and just."
114 
The only other opportunity for the Court to consider the propri­
ety of general jurisdiction came in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom­
bia, SA v Hall,175 which revealed a Court unwilling to extend the no­
tion of general jurisdiction beyond the circumstances recognized as 
173 342 US 437, 447-48 (1952) (finding general jurisdiction over a Philippine mining com­
pany with significant operations in Ohio). 
174 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA v Hall, 466 US 408, 415 (1984). 
175 466 us 408 (1984). 
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appropriate in Perkins."• Under the proposed state interest analysis 
the view is the same: only state residency or its corporate equivalent­
being organized under the laws of the state or having its corporate 
headquarters or principal place of business within the state-gives 
states the authority to exercise jurisdiction over all disputes involving 
such defendants because state sovereignty over these defendants flows 
from the state's domestic omnipotence. Disputes involving nonresi­
dents will need a connection with valid state interests to fall within the 
ambit of the state's domestic authority, a limitation that currently 
characterizes specific jurisdiction. 
6. Internet jurisdiction. 
As is the case with personal jurisdiction doctrine in its current 
form, there will be no need for a distinct analysis to address assertions 
of jurisdiction in disputes involving activity mediated through the 
Internet if the revised analysis is adopted. 177 Whether a state has a le­
gitimate interest in a dispute is a question that transcends the medium 
through which the challenged conduct occurs. For example, out-of­
state defamation of a state resident within that state implicates a 
state's interest in protecting its citizens whether the publication of the 
defamation occurs via conventional media"" or via the Internet."' This 
is not to say that the current approach to Internet jurisdiction-based 
largely upon Zippo Manufacturing Co v Zippo Dot Com, Inc'ro-will 
not be altered. To the contrary, the revised analysis proposed herein 
will result in a substantial alteration of the current approach to Inter­
net jurisdiction, which focuses on the interactivity of websites and the 
targeting of Internet activity while giving less weight to state interests."' 
It will thus often be the case that the proposed state interest analysis 
176 See id at 415-16 ("We thus must explore the nature of Helicol's contacts with the State 
of Texas to determine whether they constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general 
business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins. We hold that they do not."). 
177 See Spencer, 2006 U Ill L Rev at 75 (cited in note 152) (arguing that traditional jurisdic­
tional principles may readily be applied to analyze Internet jurisdiction fact patterns). 
178 See, for example, Calder, 465 US 783 (finding jurisdiction over a national printed tabloid). 
179 See, for example, Young v New Haven A dvocate, 315 F3d 256 ( 4th Cir 2002) (finding no 
jurisdiction over a local newspaper that made its articles available on the Internet). 
l80 952 F Supp 1119 (WD Pa 1997) (holding that a California company was subject to per­
sonal jurisdiction in a Pennsylvania forum when it intended to engage in business in the state by 
its use of the Internet and succeeded in obtaining Pennsylvania resident subscribers). See, for 
example, ALS Scan, Inc v Digital Service Consultants, Inc, 293 F3d 707, 71 4 (4th Cir 2002) (indi­
cating that the court was "adopting and adapting the Zippo model"). 
181 See, for example, A LS Scan, 293 F3d at 7 1 4  ("[S]pecific jurisdiction in the Internet con­
text may be based only on an out-of-state person's Internet activity directed at [a state] and 
causing injury that gives rise to a potential claim cognizable in [the state]."). 
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will yield results that diverge from those yielded by the current Zippo­
inspired approaches.
182 
B. The Relationship with Choice-of-Law Analysis 
The affinity between personal jurisdiction analysis and choice-of­
law analysis-which gives great consideration to a state's interest in 
having its laws applied to a dispute-is one that the Supreme Court 
unfortunately has never endorsed.'SJ The Court has addressed the rela­
tionship between choice-of-law analysis and jurisdictional analysis in 
the past but has always emphasized the distinct nature of the two.1
84 
However, there has been some sentiment on the Court acknowledging 
a close relationship between the two inquiries. Justice Black remarked 
in dissent in Hanson v Denckla185 that "the question whether the law of 
a State can be applied to a transaction is different from the question 
whether the courts of that State have jurisdiction to enter a judgment, 
but the two are often closely related and to a substantial degree de­
pend upon similar considerations." 186 Justice Brennan went so far as to 
suggest as follows: "At the minimum, the decision that it is fair to bind 
a defendant by a State's laws and rules should prove to be highly rele­
vant to the fairness of permitting that same State to accept jurisdiction 
for adjudicating the controversy."'"' Citing these views approvingly, 
Justice Brennan most recently remarked, "[T]oday there is an interac­
tion among rules governing jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and 
choice of law."188 Thus, although state interest analysis for jurisdictional 
182 For example, state interest analysis would yield a different result in Young, 315 F3d 256, 
where the Zippo-inspired approach denied jurisdiction over an out-of-state newspaper alleged to 
have published defamatory information about a forum resident on the Internet. Under state 
interest analysis, the result would be no different than that in Calder, 465 US 783, or Keeton, 465 
us 770. 
183 See Weintraub, 63 Or L Rev at 525 (cited in note 58) ("Some of the most unfortunate 
statements in the jurisdictional decisions of the Supreme Court are those denying a relationship 
between jurisdiction and choice of law."). 
184 See, for example, 436 US 84, 98 (1978) ("[T)he fact that California may be the 'center of 
gravity' for choice-of-law purposes does not mean that California has personal jurisdiction over 
the defendant."). 
185 357 us 235, 251 (1958). 
186 Id at 258 (Black dissenting). 
187 Shaffer, 433 US at 225 (Brennan concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id at 
225-26: 
[W)hen a suitor seeks to lodge a suit in a State with a substantial interest in seeing its own 
law applied to the transaction in question, we could wisely act to minimize conflicts, confu­
sion, and uncertainty by adopting a liberal view of jurisdiction, unless considerations of 
fairness or efficiency strongly point in the opposite direction. 
188 Burnham, 495 US at 634-35 n 9 (Brennan concurring in judgment) (emphasis omitted), 
citing Ferens v John Deere Co, 494 US 516, 530--31 (1990), Shaffer, 433 US at 224-26 (Brennan 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), and Hanson, 357 US at 256 (Black dissenting). 
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questions represents a departure from the Supreme Court's current 
position, the alignment with choice-of-law analysis does grow out of a 
modicum of Court sentiment supporting such a link. Such sentiment 
could form the foundation for a future Court move toward the doc­
trine herein proposed. 
Although the Court has consistently rejected the relevance of 
choice-of-law analysis to determinations of personal jurisdiction, that 
position will inevitably have to be reconsidered. A closer affinity be­
tween choice-of-law analysis and the law of jurisdiction is desirable 
because significant differences between a state's authority to enact 
legislation applicable to a dispute and its authority to adjudicate that 
dispute make little sense. 1
89 
For a state to be able to dictate, through its 
laws, the substantive outcome of a suit suggests that the state has an 
interest in the matter sufficient to permit its laws to govern rather 
than those of another state. On what basis then can a jurisdictional 
doctrine dictate that this same state is not empowered to adjudicate 
the very dispute to which its law applies? Given the subconstitutional 
status of convenience concerns, provided the defendant's due process 
right to notice is respected, no other due process protections will pre­
vent a state from exercising its sovereign authority to provide a forum 
for resolving disputes that implicate its interests. Thus, where the state 
is sufficiently interested in a dispute to have its law govern, so too will 
it typically have an interest sufficient to support jurisdiction. 
However, such will not always be the case. It is possible that a 
state may have an interest in an isolated issue among many, such that 
its law will apply only to that issue. But when the dispute is viewed as 
a whole, the state's interest may become diminutive and insufficient to 
prevent an assertion of jurisdiction from being arbitrary. The point 
here is that it is too facile to simply suggest that personal jurisdiction 
analysis should become choice-of-law analysis and the results of one 
will coincide with those of the other. To the contrary, the analyses, al­
though similar, must remain distinct so that proper results can be de-
189 One commentator argued: 
From the defendant's perspective, the differing treatment of contacts in the jurisdiction and 
choice-of-law cases turns things on their head . ... 
. . . Thus from the defendant's perspective, it seems irrational to say that due process re­
quires minimum contacts . . .  merely to hale him into the forum's court while allowing more 
tenuous contacts to upset the very outcome of the case. 
James Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law. 78 Mich L Rev 872. 879-80 (1980). See 
Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 NYU L Rev 33, 88 (1978) ("To 
believe that a defendant's contacts with the forum state should be stronger under the due proc­
ess clause for jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more 
concerned with where he will be hanged than whether. "). 
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rived from each. Thus, although under the revised analysis the forum 
whose law will apply to issues within the dispute will generally also be 
a forum sufficiently interested in the dispute to assert jurisdiction, the 
state providing the applicable law need not inevitably be the forum of 
appropriate jurisdiction. 
C. Federal Supervision of State Court Jurisdiction 
Would the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review a state's 
determination that its own interest in a dispute was sufficient to grant 
it adjudicatory jurisdiction? The requirement that a state have a le­
gitimate governmental interest in the dispute before it may assert ju­
risdiction derives not only from limitations on state sovereignty, but 
also from due process-both constitutional concerns. The exercise of 
jurisdiction by a state with no interest in a dispute involving a noncon­
senting, nonresident defendant would be a violation of the defendant's 
due process rights because a judgment rendered by a disinterested 
and unrelated sovereign would constitute arbitrary state action. Thus, 
as states continue to define the scope of their interests in adjudicating 
cases via long-arm statutes, under the proposed analysis the Supreme 
Court would review assertions of jurisdiction primarily to evaluate 
whether the purported state interests are legitimate enough to ground 
a nonarbitrary assertion of state power, without weighing the signifi­
cance of the interest itself. Similarly, the Supreme Court's authority to 
evaluate the legitimacy of state interests vis-a-vis state sovereignty 
would also derive from its authority as the ultimate interpreter of the 
Constitution, given that the extent of state sovereign authority is a 
matter of constitutional interpretation. In other words, whether a state 
action falls within that state 's authority is determined by how the 
Constitution is viewed to have diminished state sovereignty from its 
preconstitutional levels-an interpretive question the Supreme Court 
is empowered to resolve. 
How would the Court evaluate the legitimacy of the asserted in­
terest? As already mentioned, legitimacy is judged by reference to the 
scope of states' domestic police power; claims of interest in areas 
where the domestic police power does not extend could not be judged 
to be legitimate assertions of state authority. There already exists a 
rich and extensive body of jurisprudence regarding legitimate state 
interests and the scope of state police power.1
90 
The Court could draw 
190 See, for example, Granholm v Heald, 125 S Ct 1885, 1899 (2005) (regulation of liquor); 
Engine Manufacturers Association v South Coast Air Quality Management District, 541 US 246 , 
249 (2004) (air quality); Virginia v Maryland, 540 US 56 , 63, 76--77 (2003) (use of navigable wa­
ters); City of Columbus v Ours Garage and Wrecker Service, Inc, 536 US 424, 439-40 (2002) 
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upon this resource for guidance in applying the proposed state inter­
est analysis to assertions of jurisdiction. 
In addition to policing state declarations of interest based on the 
Due Process Clause and principles of state sovereign authority, the 
Court could refer to the Commerce Clause191 as a check on state over­
reaching. For example, the Court has held that if a state attempts by 
statute to subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction based 
solely on the presence of an in-state registered agent appointed as a 
condition of conducting business, jurisdiction over disputes unrelated 
to the business conducted by the corporation within the state "im­
poses upon interstate commerce a serious and unreasonable burden 
which renders the statute obnoxious to the commerce clause."
192 
Al­
though implicating the Commerce Clause, such assertions of jurisdic­
tion more fundamentally appear to violate the proper limits of a 
state's sovereign authority, because a state has no legitimate interest in 
a dispute between nonresidents over injury inflicted and sustained 
elsewhere, unless they have consented to jurisdiction in the state. Thus, 
although Commerce Clause considerations could inform the Court in 
its effort to constrain unwarranted assertions of state interest, it seems 
that it should often be the case that reference to the proper limits of a 
state's sovereign authority alone will permit a determination of the 
legitimacy of a particular assertion of jurisdiction. 
Beyond the influence the Court's oversight would have in chas­
tening outrageous claims of state interests to support jurisdiction, 
there are several additional constraints against such overreaching that 
would exist. First, although state legislatures will be responsible for 
determining, through their long-arm statutes, the range of disputes in 
which they think state interests will be implicated, state courts will be 
responsible for interpreting those statutes. These courts may, in a given 
case, decide that a particular assertion of jurisdiction is improper be­
cause the state does not actually have a sufficient legitimate interest in 
the dispute. Second, because state judgments may require recognition 
(safety on municipal streets and roads); Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc v 
Village of Stratton, 536 US 150 , 164-65 (2002) (prevention of fraud , protection of the privacy of 
residents, and the prevention of crime); Lorillard Tobacco Co v Reilly, 533 US 525, 541--42 , 
(2001) (advertising; preventing underage tobacco use); id at 591 (Stevens concurring in part , 
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (health and safety of minors); Egel­
hotf v Egelhoff, 532 US 141, 147-50 (2001) (family law); City of Erie v Pap's A.M., 529 US 277, 
296-99 (2000) (public health and safety); New Jersey v New York, 523 US 767, 771-80 (1998) 
(historic preservation , land use , and zoning); Medtronic, Inc v Lohr, 518 US 470, 475 (1996) 
("protection of lives, limbs, health , comfort, and quiet of all persons"); Holt Civic Club v City of 
Tuscaloosa, 439 US 60 , 85 (1978) (businesses). 
191 US Const Art I , §  8, cl 3. 
192 Davis v Farmers Co-operative Equity Co, 262 US 312,315 (1923). 
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in other stateS,193 states rendering the judgments are likely to develop 
statements of their own interest that are more likely to be recognized 
by other states,
194 
given the ability of states to scrutinize the jurisdic­
tional foundation of foreign default judgments before giving them full 
faith and credit.
10
' In so doing, the state will be creating more reason­
able rules that will also have application for judgments not requiring 
enforcement elsewhere, thus giving defendants in all cases the benefit 
of more reasonable, chastened long-arm statutes. Finally, if the possi­
bility of being denied foreign recognition is insufficient to lead a state 
to develop reasonable rules concerning when their interests are impli­
cated, then the state's unreasonable jurisdictional regime will quickly 
render it terra non grata to the rest of the world. That is, as businesses 
and individuals learn that the state does not restrain itself from enter­
ing and enforcing judgments against nonresidents in circumstances 
where it lacks a legitimate interest, they will decide that it is not worth 
having property, offices, or other assets located in that state."• Such a 
result would not be good for the state's economy, and thus it would 
behoove the state to maintain reasonable jurisdictional rules that con­
form with consensus views regarding state interests. 
V. REVISITING THE COURT'S SEMINAL 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION CASES 
Under state interest analysis, many of the Court's seminal per­
sonal jurisdiction cases would be decided differently. Justice Black 
provides us with some guidance for how Hanson would be resolved 
under state interest analysis. Eschewing concern over the defendant's 
193 See von Mehren and Trautman, 79 Harv L Rev at 1127 (cited in note 6) ("[A]djudicatory 
action of one jurisdiction, if it is to be fully effective, will often require the cooperation of other 
jurisdictions."). 
194 As von Mehren and Trautman stated the point, 
[A] judgment can, as a practical matter, often be made fully, or at least partially, effective 
without relying upon its recognition elsewhere. Nonetheless, in establishing bases for juris­
diction in the international sense, a legal system cannot confine its analysis solely to its own 
ideas of what is just, appropriate, and convenient. To a degree it must take into account the 
views of other communities concerned. Conduct that is overly self-regarding with respect to 
the taking and exercise of jurisdiction can disturb the international order and produce po­
litical, legal, and economic reprisals. 
Id at 112�27. 
!95 See Underwriters Natl Assurance Co v N Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins Guar 
Assn, 455 US 691, 705 (1982) ("[B]efore a court is bound by the judgment rendered in another 
State, it may inquire into the jurisdictional basis of the foreign court's decree. If that court did 
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter or the relevant parties, full faith and credit need not 
be given. "), citing Nevada v Hall, 440 US 410,421 (1979). 
196 This is an unlikely scenario, because truly outrageous assertions of state interest would 
be checked by Supreme Court oversight. 
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contacts with the state, he focused instead in the interests of the state 
in the subject matter of the dispute: 
It seems to me that where a transaction has as much relationship 
to a State as Mrs. Donner's appointment had to Florida its courts 
ought to have power to adjudicate controversies arising out of 
that transaction, unless litigation there would impose such a 
heavy and disproportionate burden on a nonresident defendant 
that it would offend what this Court has referred to as "tradi­
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice." . . .  So far as the 
nonresident defendants here are concerned I can see nothing 
which approaches that degree of unfairness. 
[W]e are dealing with litigation arising from a transaction that 
had an abundance of close and substantial connections with the 
State of F lorida.
197 
Although reflective of the Court's inappropriate regard of con­
venience as a constitutional concern, Justice Black's core analysis of 
the nature of the relationship between the state and the subject matter 
of the dispute-the decedent's (Mrs. Donner) power to appoint bene­
ficiaries of the remainder interest in the trust she established -reflects 
the key analysis that should have determined the outcome in this case. 
Mrs. Donner was a F lorida resident, as were the principal potential 
beneficiaries of the trust, and the appointment at issue was made in 
F lorida."" F lorida thus had a clear interest in resolving whether the 
appointment was valid; this interest was legitimate because the final 
disposition of a Florida decedent's estate falls within F lorida's domes­
tic sphere of protection comprehended by its police power. The Court 
thus should have recognized that F lorida's state sovereign authority 
authorized it to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute.
199 
Shaffer, which involved a shareholder derivative suit against cor­
porate officers and directors, also would be resolved differently under 
a state interest analysis. A state has a clear interest in regulating the 
conduct of officers and directors of corporations organized under its 
197 Hanson, 357 US at 258-59, 260 (Black dissenting). 
198 See id at 259 (Black dissenting). 
199 Although Delaware would also have clear interests in resolving a dispute concerning 
appointments made under a trust established in Delaware, Florida's prior assertion of jurisdic­
tion, once recognized as proper, could enable the Florida court to enjoin parties from initiating 
an identical action in Delaware. If such an injunction were not upheld, and two concurrent ac­
tions arose, the first action to result in a judgment would have a res judicata binding effect on the 
remaining proceeding. Alternatively, the Delaware court might opt to abstain from hearing the 
case or continue the action pending its resolution in the Florida court. 
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laws. This interest is legitimate because domestic corporations and their 
principals have not only agreed to be subject to the applicable state 
laws in exchange for the privilege of incorporation, but corporate mal­
feasance by principals of a Delaware corporation injures a Delaware 
resident, the corporation. Thus, in this suit by a shareholder against the 
officers and directors of a Delaware corporation for violation of fidu­
ciary duties owed to that corporation under Delaware law, Delaware's 
interests in enforcing these duties are clear. Having a clear interest in 
a dispute over the conduct of officers and directors of a Delaware 
corporation, the defendants would have been in no position to chal­
lenge the assertion of jurisdiction over them as arbitrary; jurisdiction 
would thus be upheld under state interest analysis. 
The outcome of Kulko v Superior Court,m decided shortly after 
Shaffer, also changes once state interest analysis is applied. In that 
case, the divorced mother of two children brought an action in Cali­
fornia-where the motber and children resided-against the chil­
dren's father-who resided in New York-for full custody of the chil­
dren and an increase in child support.20
1 
The custodial fate of children 
who are California residents, as well as the sufficiency of their support, 
are clearly things with which the State of California is concerned. Cali­
fornia has a substantial interest in protecting the welfare of its chil­
dren, which relates both to who would be the best caretaker for the 
children and what level of resources are needed to provide for them. 
Inadequate provision for the children could potentially place the bur­
den of caring for them upon the state, through one of its public assis­
tance programs. Thus, the state's interest in the child custody and sup­
port action was strong. The legitimacy of these interests derives from 
the fact that the nonresident father's support obligations extend to 
California citizens residing therein; California can legitimately act to 
enforce the obligations of outsiders to its citizens residing within the 
state because the breach of those obligations violates the domestic 
protection that California extends to its residents. Similarly, California 
may legitimately act to resolve the custody issue by virtue of its do­
mestic authority (indeed responsibility) to provide for the welfare of 
children residing in the state. Given that California's assertion of ju­
risdiction under such circumstances could hardly be deemed arbitrary, 
and given that adequate notice of the action was provided, the New 
York father's due process rights were fully respected. Because incon­
venience has been shown to be a subconstitutional concern, and be­
cause the interests of justice or efficiency do not necessarily militate in 
200 436 us 84 (1978). 
201 Id at 87-SS. 
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favor of having the trial in New York, the right of the California court 
to hear the case under state interest analysis seems clear. 
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v Woodson,"" the outcome un­
der a state interest analysis would also be different than the result 
reached by the Court. The plaintiffs in that case, the Robinson family, 
purchased a car in New York and were driving it through Oklahoma 
when they were struck in the rear by another car, which caused a fire 
that resulted in serious injuries to the plaintiffs."" The question in the · 
products liability suit, filed in Oklahoma, was whether jurisdiction was 
proper over the dealer that sold the plaintiffs the car, Seaway, and the 
regional distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen, in light of the fact that 
neither entity did any business in Oklahoma. The Court found that 
Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction over these defendants because 
they had not purposefully initiated contacts with Oklahoma: the con­
nection was the result of the "unilateral activity" of the plaintiffs."" 
Under state interest analysis, given that notice was not an issue in this 
case, the only question would be whether Oklahoma had a legitimate 
interest in the dispute. Professor Daan Braveman has already aptly 
analyzed the state interests of Oklahoma in the dispute between the 
plaintiffs and the New York area defendants as follows: 
Oklahoma undoubtedly had a significant interest in the adjudica­
tion of the dispute that resulted from an accident on its highways. 
Oklahoma had a legitimate interest both in promoting safety on 
its highways and in protecting the local medical creditors who 
treated the plaintiffs. Additionally, Oklahoma had an interest in 
protecting its taxpayers from the burden of providing welfare as­
sistance for the Robinsons, who were "pauperized" by the acci­
dent.205 
Thus, it is clear that the alleged wrong committed by the New York 
defendants-distributing and selling a dangerously defective prod­
uct-implicated several strong interests of Oklahoma.206 
Oklahoma's sovereign authority permitted it legitimately to exer­
cise jurisdiction over this dispute to vindicate these interests because 
202 444 us 286 (1980). 
203 Id at 288. 
204 Id at 298--99. 
205 Braveman , 33 Syracuse L Rev at 537-38 (cited in note 100) (internal citations omitted). 
206 As two commentators once observed generically regarding the propriety of state juris-
diction over a products liability dispute involving in-state harm, "(T)he supplier of potentially 
harmful goods may be viewed as undertaking a special responsibility for the welfare of the con­
sumers which makes it peculiarly inappropriate for him to resist the moral claim of the state 
when it seeks to assert power over him." Carrington and Martin, 66 Mich L Rev at 232 (cited at 
note 149). 
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the alleged wrong breached the order and highway safety provided by 
Oklahoma and endangered persons traveling on Oklahoma roads. 
Given these legitimate interests, there would be nothing arbitrary about 
Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction, and thus the defendants' due 
process rights would not be violated. The only remaining concern of 
defendants could be that litigation in Oklahoma would be inconven­
ient; however, such concerns would be unavailing here. First, the New 
York defendants could not plausibly claim any degree of inconven­
ience that would warrant depriving Oklahoma of jurisdiction where its 
interests have been implicated, given the ease with which the defen­
dants could employ local counsel and travel, if necessary, to Oklahoma 
to participate in the trial. Second and more important, the considera­
tions of convenience that comprise the forum non conveniens analysis 
weigh in favor of the plaintiffs, not the defendants. With all of the evi­
dence and witnesses surrounding the accident being in Oklahoma, and 
the evidence regarding alleged design defects not necessarily being 
located in New York, there is no good argument that the case would 
be more appropriately tried in New York. In sum, state interest analy­
sis would permit Oklahoma to exercise jurisdiction under the facts of 
World-Wide Volkswagen. 
Asahi would be a closer call. Recall that the plaintiff in Asahi was 
the driver of a motorcycle involved in an accident in California who 
claimed that the accident was caused by a defective tire tube manufac­
tured by Cheng Shen Rubber Industrial Co., Ltd., a Taiwanese com­
pany.201 Cheng Shen filed a cross-complaint against Asahi Metal Indus­
try Co., Ltd., the manufacturer of the tube's valve assembly.2'XI The 
plaintiff settled with Cheng Shen, leaving only Cheng Shen's indem­
nity action against Asahi Metal.200 Applying state interest analysis to 
these facts, on balance, the interest of California in an indemnification 
dispute between two foreign non-U.S. companies is slight. Although 
like Oklahoma in World-Wide Volkswagen, California had a clear in­
terest in resolving the cause of a fatal accident occurring on roads 
within its borders, that interest had already been vindicated because 
the victim of the accident had already been compensated via the set­
tlement agreement. The remaining dispute no longer sought to resolve 
the cause of the harm visited upon California and those traveling its 
highways, but rather it sought reimbursement for damages that Cheng 
Shen paid to the victim based on a prior foreign contractual arrange­
ment. Whether Cheng Shen was entitled to reimbursement had no 
207 480 US at 105--06. 
20s Id at 106. 
2@ Id. 
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bearing on the interest of California in ensuring the safety of vehicles 
on its roads or on its interest in ensuring that victims are adequately 
compensated if wronged.21
0 
Because of the settlement, California's in­
terest in the dispute no longer existed and any assertion of jurisdiction 
on its part would have been truly arbitrary, violating the due process 
rights of the foreign defendant, Asahi. 
Other seminal personal jurisdiction cases in which state interest 
analysis would not alter the outcome include Pennoyer, International 
Shoe, Travelers Health, Perkins, McGee, Keeton, Calder, Burger King, 
Helicopteros Nacionales, and Burnham. In Pennoyer, Mitchell sued 
Neff for $300 in unpaid legal fees, providing notice by publication in 
the newspaper of the Oregon county where Neff owned land.21 1  When 
Neff failed to appear, Mitchell obtained a default judgment and exe­
cuted the judgment on the land.212 Pennoyer subsequently purchased 
the land in a sheriff's sale, whereupon Neff appeared to challenge the 
ownership rights of Pennoyer.213 The result in Pennoyer would not 
change under state interest analysis because the nature of notice given 
in the original suit by Mitchell against Neff was completely inade­
quate. As the Court recognized, constructive notice by publication 
would have been appropriate for an action either preceded by at­
tachment of Neff's land or in an action involving the land itself, an 
action in rem.214 However, because Neffs land was not attached and 
the suit concerned personal rights and obligations rather than the 
land, the notice given was insufficient.215 
Had Neff received adequate notice of the action for unpaid legal 
fees, however, state interest analysis would indicate that Oregon would 
indeed have had a right to hear Mitchell's case against him. Given that 
21° California's interest in seeing to it that vehicles on its roads are safe and that victims are 
properly compensated arises out of the fact that the failure to ensure vehicle safety would leave 
California citizens vulnerable to accidents caused by defective parts in vehicles they purchase in 
the state, which would not only cost injuries and perhaps lives, but could also tax California's 
medical response and care resources. California has every right to protect its citizens from expo­
sure to dangerously defective products, and it also has a right to minimize dangerous conditions 
in order to prevent the needless burdening of its emergency response services. 
21 I 95 US at 717, 719-20. 
212 Id at 720. 
2 13 Id at 715--16. 
214 The Court explained the reasoning behind this rule as follows: 
The law assumes that property is always in the possession of its owner, in person or by 
agent; and it proceeds upon the theory that its seizure will inform him, not only that it is 
taken into the custody of the court, but that he must look to any proceedings authorized by 
law upon such seizure for its condemnation and sale. 
Id at 727. 
215 Id ("But where the entire object of the action is to determine the personal rights and 
obligations of the defendants, that is, where the suit is merely in personam, constructive service in 
this form upon a non-resident is ineffectual for any purpose. "). 
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Neff contracted for services with an Oregon resident-Mitchell-and 
then allegedly breached that contract, Oregon had an interest in hear­
ing a dispute involving a nonresident alleged to owe a debt to a resi­
dent. Oregon has an interest in seeing to it that those who come into 
the state and make agreements with its citizens uphold those agree­
ments.216 Thus, Oregon's assertion of jurisdiction to enforce the obliga­
tions of a contract between an Oregonian and an outsider could not 
fairly be classed as arbitrary and would be upheld, assuming proper 
notice. 
This analysis would also obtain for the facts of Burger King, which 
involved a nonresident defendant who had entered into a contract 
with a Florida corporation and was subsequently being sued in Florida 
for an alleged breach. Florida had a strong interest-which it had ar­
ticulated in its long-arm statute
211 
-in enforcing contracts between 
nonresidents and residents and in protecting their residents against 
alleged breaches by outsiders. Thus, the Court's holding that jurisdic­
tion was appropriate in that case would not be disturbed under the 
proposed state interest analysis. 
The remaining jurisdictional cases mentioned above would be 
similarly decided under state interest analysis because the Court in 
each of these cases upheld jurisdiction where significant state interests 
can be said to have been present, or, in the case of Helicopteros Na­
cionales, denied jurisdiction after correctly determining that the state 
had an insufficient interest to support general jurisdiction.21
8 
The state 
of Washington's clear interest in enforcing the tax obligations of a 
company operating within its borders would certainly permit that 
state to exercise jurisdiction in International Shoe. In Perkins, Ohio 
had a strong interest in adjudicating all disputes involving Benguet 
Consolidated because that company had taken up residence within 
the state, with all of its management activities occurring therein.219 
There would be nothing arbitrary about Ohio's exercise of jurisdiction 
over this resident corporation because Ohio rightly has sovereign au­
thority over all state residents, both individual and corporate. The pro-
216 See, for example, Or Rule Civ Pro 4(E) (2003) (indicating that Oregon courts have 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant in any proceeding that "[a]rises out of a promise, made 
anywhere to the plaintiff . . .  to pay for services to be performed in this state by the plaintiff"). 
211 Burger King, 471 US at 463--64 (noting that "Florida's long-arm statute extends jurisdic­
tion to '[a]ny person , whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,' who, inter alia, 
'[b]reach[es] a contract in this state by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be 
performed in this state ,' so long as the cause of action arises from the alleged contractual 
breach"), quoting Fla Stat § 48.193(1)(g) (Supp 1984). 
218 See Part IV.A.5 for a discussion of general jurisdiction in the context of the proposed 
state interest analysis. 
219 342 US at 445--46. 
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priety of the results reached in Travelers Health,
220 McGee,''' Keeton,222 
and Calder223 under state interest analysis have already been explained 
and need not be repeated here."' Finally, the transient jurisdiction up­
held in Burnham would fare no differently under the proposed analy­
sis because, as explained above,"' the domestic omnipotence that states 
continue to enjoy gives them sovereign authority over all persons found 
within their borders. 
From the above review it becomes clear that the Court's current 
approach to jurisdiction is not yielding the proper result in all cases. To 
the contrary, the Court has too often rejected assertions of jurisdiction 
that state interest analysis would have sustained. In each of the cases 
rejecting jurisdiction, the main culprit was an undue concern either for 
the convenience of the defendant or for the expectations of the de­
fendant and its intention to subject itself to the authority of the forum. 
But convenience has no proper place within jurisdictional analysis 
and, as has been shown, can be dealt with through the doctrines of 
venue and forum non conveniens. Neither do the expectations of the 
defendant or its intent to submit to a state's authority bear on jurisdic­
tional analysis because the former concern is wholly a product of 
whatever law the Court pronounces,"• and the latter is a remnant of 
bygone efforts to impute fictive consent relationships between states 
and defendants to justify assertions of jurisdiction. Although one may 
voluntarily consent to a state's authority, state sovereign authority 
does not depend on consent but rather is solely a function of the 
power of the state. As this brief review shows, once concern with the 
intentions, expectations, and experiences of inconvenience of the de­
fendants are removed from jurisdictional analysis, the proper consid­
erations of state sovereign authority and protection against arbitrary, 
illegitimate assertions of jurisdiction result in an expansion of the ju-
220 339 US at 647-48 (upholding jurisdiction based on the fact that "a state has a legitimate 
interest in all insurance policies protecting its residents against risks, an interest which the state 
can protect even though the 'state action may have repercussions beyond state lines"'). 
221 355 US at 223 (noting the forum state's "manifest interest in providing effective means 
of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims"). 
222 465 US at 777 (finding that "New Hampshire has clearly expressed its interest in protect­
ing such persons [nonresidents) from libel, as well as in safeguarding its populace from false­
hoods" and "New Hampshire also has a substantial interest in cooperating with other States, 
through the 'single publication rule,' to provide a forum for efficiently litigating all issues and 
damage claims arising out of a libel in a unitary proceeding"). 
223 465 US at 789 (citing, as support for its jurisdictional holding, the Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws § 37, comment a, which explains, "A state has a natural interest in the effects 
of an act within its territory even though the act itself was done elsewhere"). 
224 See text accompanying notes 121-23 (Travelers Health), 1 24-26 (McGee), 129-33 (Cal­
der), and 134-37 (Keeton). 
225 See text accompanying notes 147-50. 
226 See text accompanying notes 142-44. 
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risdictional reach of states beyond what the Court currently embraces, 
but in line with the authority that states actually enjoy under our Con­
stitution. 
CONCLUSION 
There is indeed a way out of the labyrinth the Court has created 
through its law of personal jurisdiction, if the Court is willing to take 
it. By stepping away from the contemporary jurisdictional doctrine of 
purposefulness and convenience to explore the relevant meanings of 
due process and state sovereignty, it becomes apparent that due process 
as convenience, and state sovereignty as contingent on some degree of 
assent, are mistaken notions that should be discarded. In their stead, 
due process as notice and as a guard against arbitrariness, and state 
sovereign authority as omnipotence over all disputes implicating the 
sovereign interest, create a doctrine substantially more faithful to tra­
ditional understandings of those concepts. 
Further, adoption of the revised analysis would improve predict­
ability: beyond notice, the sole issue for consideration would be the 
presence and legitimacy of a state's interest in a dispute. Because the 
nature and scope of legitimate state interests is a more generic and 
settled issue than whether, under the facts of a given case, a defendant 
has manifested the requisite degree of purposefulness, or whether the 
burden on a defendant would be too great to bear, jurisdictional litiga­
tion would likely be less frequently and vigorously pursued under the 
revised analysis. Indeed, as the Court would, over time, speak to the 
range of legitimate state interests in the jurisdictional context, there 
would be vastly greater resolution and guidance for future litigants 
than current jurisdictional precedent has been able to provide, given 
the fact-specific nature of the existing analysis. As a result, once cer­
tain battles were fought and resolved, jurisdictional litigation would 
likely subside to a much lower level of activity than is prevalent today. 
Moving the doctrine toward state interest analysis is imminently 
possible
221 
because the Court need not expressly overrule its jurisdic­
tional precedents to embrace the proposed revision to personal juris­
diction analysis.
228 Rather, the Court could simply clarify that its previ-
227 Consider Abrams and Dimond, 69 Minn L Rev at 109 (cited in note 9) ("A proposal for 
a new constitutional structure for evaluating state court assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
presents only an intriguing intellectual exercise if it offers no promise of adoption."). 
228 In promoting doctrinal reform without dramatic fundamental precedential upheaval, it 
is my hope to offer a proposal that stands some chance of being embraced by members of the 
Court, in contrast to proposals that call for a wholesale abandonment of the basic International 
Shoe doctrine. See, for example, McFarland, 68 Mo L Rev at 789-90 (cited in note 12) ("While 
everyone realizes the Supreme Court is reluctant to cast aside even one of its decisions, let alone 
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ous decisions were concerned both with due process and federal­
ism/state sovereignty issues because the former comprehend limita­
tions that are given substance by the latter. That is, the right to be free 
from arbitrary assertions of state power -a due process right-is 
evaluated with reference to whether a given assertion of power is le­
gitimate in view of the limits on a state's sovereign authority. Once the 
Court articulates this view, it could then simply further clarify that its 
original insistence on a minimal connection between a defendant's 
actions and the forum state in International Shoe reflected the fact 
that the limits of state sovereign authority could permit jurisdiction 
over only those disputes in which the state could claim a legitimate 
interest. Indeed, such a restatement would be more in line with the 
original unitary test created by the International Shoe Court. The 
original test was not the bifurcated analysis of whether there are 
minimum contacts followed by a determination of the reasonableness 
of jurisdiction that we have today; rather, the test was a unified analy­
sis that simply required minimum contacts "such that" the assertion of 
jurisdiction was fair and just.
229 
Under state interest analysis, after as­
suring itself of the sufficiency of notice, a court would engage in a 
similar, unified inquiry, asking whether the state has a legitimate in­
terest in the dispute such that the assertion of jurisdiction is not arbi­
trary and is thus consistent with the due process rights of the defen­
dant. Reassigning convenience considerations to venue and forum non 
conveniens analyses would require a repudiation of language in ear­
lier opinions that constitutionalizes convenience, unless the Court pre­
fers to gloss the issue by maintaining that inconvenience extreme 
enough to undermine the meaningful right to be heard is the essence of 
a whole area of law, in favor of beginning anew, sometimes that is exactly what is needed .... Toe 
Supreme Court should drop the Shoe."). But see Abrams and Dimond, 69 Minn L Rev at 80 
( cited in note 9): 
From another perspective, the proposed law should be palatable to the Court because in 
many ways it is not truly starting afresh. The intentional transactional entry test is crafted in 
large part from Court precedents. The test can in part be seen as a restatement of the 
Court's requirement that a defendant must "purposefully avail " itself of the benefits and 
protections of the laws of the forum state. 
229 As McFarland observed: 
[T]he original, unpolished International Shoe test is clearly a one-step, unitary test. A court 
is not required to find "minimum contacts " and "fair play and substantial justice. " Neither is 
a court required to find "minimum contacts" or "fair play and substantial justice." The opin­
ion requires a court find "minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' The con­
nective words "such that " meld the test into a single, unitary whole. 
McFarland, 68 Mo L Rev at 763-64 (cited in note 12). 
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the constitutional convenience concern.230 With these moves, the Court 
could realign the doctrine in the way herein proposed without giving 
too much offense ( or too much obedience) to stare decisis. 
In the end, what must be recognized is that the Constitution re­
serves to states the power to hear cases in their courts so long as no 
federal constitutional provisions are transgressed.
2
•11 It is this power, 
then, that must serve as the germinating source for developing an un­
derstanding of the reach of a state's courts. Only after that picture of 
state power develops must it then be cabined to conform to the re­
quirements of the national Constitution. In the jurisdictional context, 
we have seen what this means: the authority of states to assert jurisdic­
tion in all disputes where their legitimate interests are implicated is 
limited only by the need to provide adequate notice of the proceed­
ings. The presence of legitimate state interests thus becomes the touch­
stone of the analysis, as it properly should be. For states have too long 
had to endure the emasculation of their authority via the divestment 
of jurisdiction that has flowed from doctrinal obeisance to the demon­
strably subconstitutional prerogatives of defendants. So too have plain­
tiffs languished under a doctrine that closed courthouse doors that 
more properly should have been open. Only by purging the doctrine 
of its tenets of purposefulness and convenience, and rooting the analy­
sis in notice and legitimate sovereign authority, can the Court finally 
arrive at a sound approach that will yield just and predictable jurisdic­
tional results. 
230 Such an approach would be almost entirely a face-saving measure of no real import 
because, as discussed above, see text accompanying notes 71-75, it is difficult to imagine circum­
stances that would work the requisite degree of inconvenience in modern times. 
231 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at 293 ("[T]he Framers also intended that the States 
retain many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular , the sovereign power to try 
causes in their courts."). 
